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Abstract

The allocation of resources is a ubiquitous decision making task. In the
workplace, resource allocation, in the context of multiple task and/or work
demands, is significantly related to task performance as the commitment of more
resources generally results in better performance on a given task. I apply both
resource and naturalistic decision making theories to better understand resource
allocation behavior and related performance. Resource theories suggest that
individuals have limited cognitive capacity: limited capacity may limit
performance in dynamic situations such as situations that involve the allocation of
attentional resources. Additionally, the naturalistic decision making framework
highlights the role of context cues as key aids to effective decision making.
Therefore, I proposed an interactive relationship between working memory, a
cognitive resource, and allocation cue, a contextual variable. Specifically, I
conducted an experimental study in which I manipulated allocation cue type and
examined the individual difference of working memory on allocation behavior
and task performance. I hypothesized a moderated-mediated effect including cue
type, working memory, and proportion of time on task on task performance (i.e.,
accuracy and efficiency). The effect of cue type on both the proportion of time
spent on task and task performance was expected to be contingent on working
memory capacity. As working memory increased, both time on task and
performance were expected to increase for participants exposed to either goal- or
both task- and goal-related cues, as opposed to task cues. Conversely, as working
memory decreased both time on task and performance were expected to increase
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for participants exposed to task cues in comparison to those exposed to either
goal- or both task- and goal-related cues. Additionally, as proportion of time on
task increased, performance was expected to improve. Results from this study did
not find support for the hypothesized moderated-mediated effect. However,
results indicated an effect of task cue on task efficiency. Specifically, individuals
cued to allocate their attention based stimulus-related features (i.e., task cue)
completed the task more quickly. Theoretical and practical implications as well as
study limitations are discussed in detail.
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PART I
Introduction

Modern-day organizations are plagued with distractions. Consider the following
example:
It is 8:00 am on a Monday. Beth has just arrived at her office, and she is
looking forward to finishing a paper she has been putting off for weeks.
The paper is a “revise and resubmit”, and the deadline for the revision is
approaching. Her plan is to prioritize this task; she has given a great deal
of thought to her approach for the edits, and she is ready to begin working.
She turns her computer on and opens the file to begin writing. However,
as is typical of Monday mornings, within 30 minutes, her e-mail
notifications begin flooding in. Will she continue to focus on her writing,
or will she stop and respond to the e-mails? Additionally, how might her
allocation decision influence her writing performance?
A recent study by Samsung and the University of Leeds suggested that
employee distraction is widespread. Employees surveyed spent an average of only
22 minutes completing uninterrupted work each day, which is estimated to cost
UK companies £250 million each year (Press Association, 2015).
In modern organizations, employees frequently experience autonomy and
are networked to other employees. Such conditions require employees to make
decisions about how to manage their tasks. Decision making is influenced by
prior choices and incorporates other external factors (Atkinson & Birch, 1978),
such as organizational politics and task interdependence. Additionally, in many
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cases, employees’ personal interpretations of their roles may introduce
idiosyncratic views about how work should be performed and prioritized
(Sanchez & Levine, 2009). Resource allocation behavior, or how individuals
partition their cognitive energy or attention among tasks, ultimately influences the
effectiveness of job performance (Minbashian & Luppino, 2014).
Performance is generally higher on tasks that receive more attention
(Minbashian & Luppino, 2014). Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that
employees allocate their attention to the highest priority tasks that are aligned
with organizational goals. Allocation decisions differ among individuals, and
researchers have used a number of theories to explain resource allocation.
From the self-regulation perspective, it is suggested that resources are
often allocated to whichever goal or task shows the least progress or most
discrepancy between current and desired states (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Latham
& Locke, 1991; Schmidt & DeShon, 2007). Individuals are likely to focus on
completing tasks that are in need of the most attention to catch up on their
progress. In contrast, expectancy theory has suggested that some individuals are
more likely to commit their efforts to tasks or goals with a smaller discrepancy
between the current and desired completion states (Kernan & Lord, 1990;
Schmidt & Dolis, 2009). This theory thus suggests that some employees may
prioritize tasks that are closer to completion. More recently, it has been suggested
that the decision regarding which task to prioritize is influenced by environmental
volatility—or, the unpredictable nature of the task environment (Schmidt, Dolis,
& Tolli, 2009). Specifically, when environmental volatility is low (i.e., task
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progress is largely influenced by the individual), individuals allocate more
resources to the task that is closer to completion before they focus on the task
further from completion; however, when environmental volatility is high (i.e.,
task progress is largely influenced by external factors), individuals allocate more
resources to the task furthest from completion before they focus on the task
closest to completion (Schmidt et al., 2009).
This finding by Schmidt et al. (2009) raised an important concern about
the allocation of attention in the dynamic or rapidly changing situations that exist
in highly volatile organizational environments. Specifically, if the task most
valued by the organization is the one furthest from completion, employees may
erroneously allocate attention to alternative tasks. For example, an employee may
decide to focus on a task closer to completion or one easier to complete, such as
responding to e-mails. Therefore, to enhance job performance, it is important to
identify interventions to support the proper allocation of attention. There is still
much to be discovered about the following areas: a) how employees make
allocation decisions, b) the potential predictors of allocation behavior, and c) the
performance effects of differing allocation patterns. The judgment and decision
making literature embedded within the meta-perspective of the person–situation
perspective has provided some insight into potential strategies.
As a meta-theory, the person-by-situation interaction suggests that
behavior is a function of both environmental factors and individual differences
(Endler & Magnusson, 1976; Lewin, 1939). Within the domain of environmental
factors or context effects, the current study focuses on context cues with direct
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reference to the judgment and decision making literature. Specifically, naturalistic
decision making focuses on describing how decisions are made in dynamic and
often high-stakes situations (Klein, 1998; Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas,
2001). The naturalistic approach to decision making departs from the traditional
models of decision making, which suggests that decision-makers generate and
compare alternatives, by focusing on how decisions are made under difficult
conditions (Klein, 2008). Using naturalistic decision making perspective, I
explore how a contextual element (i.e., cues) influences performance in the
context of resource allocation. I propose that the judgment and decision making
literature has provided relevant lens for an examination of resource allocation,
because the shifting of attention from one task to the next is, in effect, a judgment
and decision making process. This perspective is aligned with that of other
researchers who have also promoted a decision making approach to resource
allocation (e.g., Ball, Langholtz, Auble, & Sopchak, 1998; Langholtz, Ball,
Sopchak, & Auble, 1997; Langholtz, Gettys, & Foote, 1994). I further suggest, in
conjunction with the role played by context cues, an interaction between these
environmental factors and a salient individual difference variable—working
memory capacity.
The resource allocation literature has suggested that individual
differences, such as cognitive abilities, influence the allocation process by
determining the amount of available resources an individual has to assign among
tasks and other work demands (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Elsewhere in the
literature, the suggestion has been made to begin exploring more specific
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cognitive predictors of job performance (e.g., Wee, Newman, & Joseph, 2014).
Working memory is one important individual difference within the job
performance literature.
Working memory, a source of intelligence, is an important predictor of
work performance (Krumm, Schmidt-Atzert, & Lipnevich, 2013) and is related to
the regulation of attention (Kane & Engle, 2003). Specifically, higher working
memory capacity is associated with more sustained focus on goal-directed
activities (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Vinding, 2004; Redick & Engle, 2006).
Implied by this is the possibility that the efficacy of working memory capacity as
a predictor of performance may depend on the presence of goal-directed factors
within the environment. This research is a further attempt to gain a better
understanding of the resource allocation domain.
Several researchers have acknowledged the value of resource allocation
research and have called for future research on the process (e.g., Ball et al., 1998;
Gonzalez, Langholtz, & Sopchak, 2002; Langholtz et al, 1997; Langholtz et al.,
1994; Minbashian & Luppino, 2014; Randall, Oswald, & Beier, 2014; Schmidt &
DeShon, 2007; Schmidt & Dolis, 2009). This research responds to that call by
expanding on what is currently known about resource allocation behavior.
Specifically, this research is an exploration of the extent to which cues helps
individuals effectively allocate attention; and the extent to which this relationship
is a function of the type of working memory.
In the following sections, I review the literature on resource allocation, as
well as the individual differences and situational factors that influence the
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process. I also introduce naturalistic decision making and discuss its proposed
application to resource allocation. Specifically, first, I provide a general review of
resource theories, followed by an introduction to resource allocation as an
important performance criterion. Second, I discuss the theoretical underpinnings
of resource allocation. In reviewing these theories, I provide the foundation for
the predictions that follow. Third, I provide an overview of attention, the resource
in question, as well as a review of the processes regulating selective attention.
Fourth, I discuss working memory as a cognition-related individual difference and
demonstrate how situational stressors work in tandem with this individual
difference. Finally, I discuss the applicability of naturalistic decision making and
highlight its underlying mechanism (i.e., its reliance on cues).
Resource Theories
Resource theories (e.g., Hobfoll, 1987; Norman & Bobrow, 1975) are a
means to explain the limits of human capacity on performance, and they provide a
general framework to explore the allocation of resources. These theories provide a
structure for explaining the effects of task characteristics and individual
differences on the cognitive resource and performance relationship. There are two
critical propositions of resource theories. The first is that cognitive or attentional
resources are limited (Kahneman, 1973). The second is that the performance–
resource allocation relationship is influenced by ability level and the nature of the
task; specifically, low ability reduces the amount of resources available for
allocation (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989).
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Generally, cognitive ability is the primary resource in resource theories
(Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). When people work on multiple tasks that require the
same psychological resources, their performance on one task may interfere with
their performance on another task, given the limits of cognitive resources
(Norman & Bobrow, 1975). At the same time, certain boundary conditions have
been identified that regulate the cognitive ability-performance effect. For
example, task difficulty moderates the cognitive ability and performance
relationship such that high cognitive ability enhances performance on difficult
tasks (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Such finding demonstrates that when using
the resource theory paradigm, the consideration of situational or task-related
factors is useful for exploring the effects of attentional resources on performance,
and how resources are allocated to tasks.
Resource theories often explain the relationship between cognitive ability
and task performance, while resource allocation theories go a step further by
specifically explaining how resources are allocated to tasks (Randall et al., 2014).
The self-regulation literature is typically applied to resource allocation.
Specifically, effective self-regulation is associated with enhanced task
performance: people who are able to self-regulate effectively are able to direct
attentional efforts to areas where resources are needed to meet task goals (Carver
& Scheier, 1990; Erez, 1977). Therefore, in situations where resources are not
being assigned as needed to complete a task, performance may suffer (Randall et
al., 2014). This is particularly relevant to performance in situations where there
are multiple priorities or tasks. Employees having to allocate their time between
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multiple projects need to be able to monitor and adjust (i.e., self-regulate) their
attentional resources efficiently in order to meet the goals of multiple
assignments.
Resource theories can be explained using the dual-process approach to
cognitive processes. The dual-process model includes two primary processing:
automatic and controlled processes (Schiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Automatic
processing involves low effort and rapid or holistic thinking, while controlled
processes include high effort and slow or analytic thinking (Evans, 2008). This
distinction between controlled and automatic processes helps to determine the
amount of cognitive resources necessary for task performance, depending on the
nature of the task. For example, a task requiring controlled mental processes may
require more cognitive resources than one that involves more automatic mental
processes. Within the domain of resource theories, the dual-process model
provides a base for explaining the effects of task characteristics on performance
(Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Norman & Bobrow, 1975).
In other words, the nature of a task determines the extent to which
resource limitations influence task performance. Specifically, resource-limited
tasks are those for which performance is primarily dependent on attentional
resources, while data-limited tasks are those where the impact of attentional
resources on performance is only negligible (i.e., performance is independent of
resource processing; Norman & Bobrow, 1975). For example, a very simple task
may be said to be data-limited, as performance changes would occur due to ease
of performing the task rather than the amount of effort committed to completing
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the task. Resource theories have aided the development of resource allocation
theories.
Resource Allocation
Making decisions about the allocation of resources is a universal practice.
People make these decisions in their personal lives to determine how they assign
their leisure time, money, and other useful resources. At work, this practice is
equally prevalent because in many cases employees must make decisions about
how they assign their time and effort among multiple tasks and other work-related
demands. Despite this reality, very little research attention has been directed to
understanding performance progress under conditions of multiple or competing
priorities (Schmidt, Dolis, & Tolli, 2009) or to how effective people are at making
allocation decisions (Ball et al., 1998; Riekamp, Busemeyer, & Laine, 2003). Yet,
is has been established that the allocation of resources influences the variability in
job performance such that performance is higher on tasks with more cognitive
resources assigned (Minbashian & Luppino, 2014).
The commitment of cognitive and other resources may help to explain
resource allocation as a performance outcome of interest in the workplace. That is
to say, we may be able to extend the extant literature regarding predictors of job
performance to explain some of the variation in resource allocation performance.
Predictors such as general mental ability, conscientiousness, goal orientation, and
self-efficacy (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; Sitzmann & Ely,
2011; Vandewalle, 1997) which are strong predictors of job performance in the
general domain may contribute somewhat to resource allocation performance.
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However, to help to better understand the specific context of resource allocation,
it is important to consider domain-specific predictors that may provide more
precise predictions of performance in situations where attention is being
regulated.
In situations involving multiple attentional demands, an employee may be
required to determine how best to allocate his/her psychological resources (e.g.,
attention, commitment, mental energy, or effort) between equally important tasks.
In such cases, performance levels should be maintained for each task in a manner
that avoids one or more tasks being neglected at the expense of another.
Identifying how employees strategize the commitment of their effort or time when
working on multiple tasks is critical, as this helps to determine the direct
contribution of attention on performance within the context of multiple or
competing priorities.
However, the resource allocation problem is often a difficult one to
intuitively resolve as choice options generally differ in interrelated ways (Ball et
al., 1998). For example, consider Nick, a marketing representative determining
how to allocate his time between Products A and B. Prioritizing product A may
require less in terms of creative energy but may hurt the department’s overall
performance if product B has a larger income potential. If creativity and income
are the only valued resources being considered, then this allocation problem may
be less difficult to resolve. To be exact, if one simply considers which of the two
outcomes—creativity or income—is more valuable, then selecting between
product A and B could be directed by whichever option helps to secure the more
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valued outcome. In reality, however, Nick’s resource allocation decision may be
far more complex. Choices may be influenced by multiple contextual factors,
including environmental and task conditions, risk, uncertainty, power, and politics
(Langholtz, et al., 1997; Langholtz, et al., 1994; Langholtz, Gettys, & Foote,
1993; Pfeffer, 1992). For example, Nick’s decision may be influenced by his
perceived difficulty of the two tasks, directions from a superior, or work norms
and patterns within his department, such as a tendency toward planning or
interruptions from peers seeking assistance. Therefore, several factors may
influence Nick’s allocation decision, making the identification of ideal allocation
a challenging one.
Within the literature on cognitive psychology, mathematical models have
been applied to identify optimal resource allocation under different circumstances
(e.g., Langholtz et al., 1997; Langholtz et al., 1994). These attempts have largely
focused on identifying and testing ideal allocation algorithms. Mathematical
modeling, and specifically, Linear Programming (LP; Dantzig, 1963), is a method
frequently applied in the operations research and management science literature.
LP provides a formula for calculating ideal allocation strategies based on
knowledge of the amount of resources available and how these resources combine
to produce a return. While such resource allocations may be useful for some tasks,
it may be unrealistic for employees to use them as decision aids as they encounter
typical and daily resource allocation problems such as how to spend their time
during the day. More likely, people rely on natural cognitive processes when
making these decisions—processes that are influenced by individual differences
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and situational factors. Differences between individuals have been observed based
on situational factors such as levels of uncertainty or risk.
Prior research on resource allocation decisions (i.e., for resources
including time and fuel, for example) and the influence of contextual factors has
focused on assessing performance under conditions of high and low risk and
uncertainty. This includes circumstances where resources are limited and the
potential for loss is high. For example, using a Coast Guard scheduling task, 30
participants were challenged with scheduling two boats to maximize operating
hours while ensuring minimum patrol hours. Participants were warned about the
history of unforeseen incidences resulting in losses and had a fixed amount of fuel
and personnel hours for completing the task (see Langholtz et al., 1994).
Participants were assigned to either a low, moderate, or high difficulty condition
with difficulty intensifying as the amount of time required to operate the boats
increased. Results demonstrated that participants’ overall performance
approached optimal levels. Participants were better able to complete the task
when task difficulty was low. Under conditions of high difficulty, success was
most likely for those who appropriately allocated resources based on the optimal
allocation determined by an LP model (Langholtz et al., 1994).
Furthermore, while those under conditions of certainty and risk selfcorrected to avoid missed opportunities for allocation, those under conditions of
uncertainty were significantly less likely to do so. Evidence also suggests that
participants were able to learn more efficient resource allocation strategies
(Langholtz et al., 1993). Collectively, these results suggest that research attention
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to the process of resource allocation is promising. Specifically, given the
association between effective resource allocation and performance, and evidence
that situational factors and learning may enhance performance, researchers and
practitioners may benefit from having a better understanding of how resource
allocation decisions occur.
The Allocation of Attention
Employees are faced with multiple task demands, such as writing reports,
attending meetings, meeting deadlines, and attending to e-mails (many times noncritical e-mails). These tasks represent constant streams of information that
require attention. Attention is “the taking possession by the mind, in clear and
vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or
trains of thought… [I]t implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal
effectively with others” (James, 1883, p. 381–382). Attention may be studied
from either a divided or selective paradigm. In both cases, the assumption is that
attentional resources are limited (Kahneman, 1973).
To effectively manage their time, employees must selectively process
relevant aspects of work-related demands while ignoring irrelevant portions as
called for by the situation. This is known as selective attention, which is the
“differential processing of simultaneous sources of information” (Johnston &
Dark, 1986, p. 44). While specific to auditory stimuli, the cocktail party problem
(Cherry, 1953) is a good illustration of selective attention. The cocktail party
effect occurs when an individual is presented with a variety of stimuli, similar to
those presented while at a cocktail party, including multiple and simultaneous
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conversations in the background. However, it may be possible to selectively focus
on one dominant conversation despite the distractions. Similarly, an employee
may be bombarded with a litany of responsibilities but can consciously focus (i.e.,
selectively attend) on completing one task at a given time.
Several models have been used to explain selective attention. The
Broadbent Filter Model (Broadbent, 1958) explains how information becomes
ignored during the selection process. This model suggests that individuals focus
on the physical features of information (e.g., color or visual information, pitch of
auditory stimuli) very early in the selection process. Therefore, unattended cues
are filtered out on the basis of physical features and not transferred to short-term
memory. The second model of selective attention, Treisman’s Attenuation Model
(Treisman, 1960), further builds on the Filter Model to explain how and why
individuals are able to switch their attention suddenly from focusing on writing a
report to responding to a critical e-mail. This theory suggests that rather than
being completely blocked out, critical but unattended information (such as a
secondary task), is attenuated and transferred to short-term memory. Further, late
selection models have suggested that even unattended information is processed
and that relevant information receives conscious awareness (Deutsch & Deutsch,
1963). The major distinction between early (i.e., the Filter Model) and late
selection models is whether the selection of what to attend to occurs before or
after processing.
Still, one may respond to an instant task request, such as an urgent e-mail,
while focusing on a different task (i.e., by divided attention). Divided attention,
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or processing multiple sources of information at the same time (Johnston & Dark,
1986) may impair performance, as this requires performing multiple processes
simultaneously as in multi-tasking situations. From the perspective of capacity
theory, being selective is necessary, as attentional resources are limited
(Kahneman, 1973). Therefore, based on this assumption, employees would need
to attend to their e-mail or complete a report, rather than attempting to do both
simultaneously. At the same time, assuming that all tasks competing for attention
are relevant to the greater goal of the organization, the management of attention is
more dynamic a process than simply selecting a single task to prioritize. In other
words, effective performance may depend on making changes to the allocation of
attention, effort, or time as called for by the situation.
Flexibility of attention is required to cognitively manage multiple
processes (Kahneman, 1973). What an individual attends to is determined by
goals, and attention helps to create a balance between the need for focus and
flexibility (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010). Therefore, in the management of multiple
priorities or tasks, an employee will be required to effectively balance the need to
focus on certain priorities with the ability to be flexible enough to switch between
tasks, as required. This process of attention regulation is governed by
performance goals which enable self-regulation (Locke & Latham, 2002). Further,
human behavior is influenced by the interaction between goals and their
associated stimuli (Pashler, Johnston, & Ruthruff, 2001). For example, an
individual may determine which task to focus their attention on based on
departmental goal (i.e., to complete report by the end of the month) or based a
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feature of the task itself (e.g., task progress or difficulty). This determination is
based on the dominant mode of processing being employed—top-down or
bottom-up.
Top-down regulation of attention.
Top-down regulation, or endogenous control (Posner, 1980), refers to
attentional regulation that is cognitively derived or goal-driven (Pashler et al,
2001). This system of control functions to activate related cognitive structures and
inhibits competing processes to prevent interruptions (Lord & Levy, 1994). To
illustrate, this would equate to prioritizing tasks based on their relationship to an
overarching goal. As a result, thinking back to the context in the opening
example, if one’s principal goal is to enhance teaching, and not to enhance
research productivity, then tasks related to teaching would be prioritized before
those related to other activities. Goal setting may facilitate more effective
teaching; for example, a goal to increase teaching evaluation scores and the
monitoring of that goal based on feedback can help to regulate attention and effort
in light of that goal. The goal setting and feedback processes function in support
of top-down regulation of attention.
Top-down regulation is also a feature of deliberate task preparation
(Ruthruff, Remington, & Johnston 2001), which can provide some advantages to
task performance and mirrors the literature on goal-setting and planning. Topdown regulation may involve setting goals and calculating goal progress. Goals
are critical for directing attention and effort, energizing, driving persistence, and
stimulating task-relevant knowledge (Locke & Latham, 2002). Additionally,

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

19

given that resource allocation represents a dynamic decision making process
accounting for evolving situational demands (Atkinson & Birch, 1978), the use of
a top-down strategy may be critical for success. That is to say, the development of
a specific plan before implementation may help reduce any ambiguity inherent in
allocation tasks. Drawing on the literature on planning, creating a strategy prior to
beginning a task is associated with several benefits. Planning facilitates goal
development (i.e., intellectual benefit) and helps to stimulate confidence and
persistence (i.e., volitional benefit) toward a task (Gollwitzer, 1996). As is
established in the literature, goal-setting is associated with enhanced performance
(Locke & Latham, 2002). Therefore, the implicit parallel between planning and
the top-down regulation strategy suggests that approach may provide a
performance advantage.
Elsewhere in the literature, top-down processing resembles the ‘search and
schedule’ strategy (SAS), which is a resource allocation strategy involving
detailed search and scheduling of resources prior to approaching tasks (Ball et al.,
1998). The SAS strategy involves an overall assessment of the allocation problem
and calculations to arrive at the optimal solution prior to beginning a task. This
strategy represents a “less sophisticated” version of the LP solution and is similar
to strategies from the problem-solving literature, including means-end analysis
and hill-climbing (Ball et al., 1998, p. 73). Consistent with the dual-process
approach to thinking and reasoning, one could suspect that the processes involved
in this approach would therefore be somewhat consistent with more controlled
and analytical cognitive processing (Evans, 2008; Schiffrin & Schneider, 1977).
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While it has been established that goal-driven processes such as attending
to goal-setting (e.g., Locke & Latham, 2002) and planning (e.g., Gollwitzer,
1996) are advantageous to task performance, there are situations in which these
benefits are limited. For example, when individuals are given a goal during
training, performance tends to be lower compared to those given no goal,
especially for individuals with low cognitive ability (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989).
This effect, explained by the limited capacity perspective (Kahneman, 1973), is
likely to be seen because the self-regulation process demands attentional
resources, which further stresses the limited capacity of those with low cognitive
ability. As a result, these individuals are unable to focus as much on learning, as
their attentional resources are also being devoted to self-regulating their goal
progress. While performance may increase over time for these individuals, their
performance may continue to lag behind both their high cognitive ability
counterparts and those with low cognitive ability who are not assigned a goal
(Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). This effect is seen during the initial phase of skill
acquisition, or when a task is novel or complex—during which time, the demand
for cognitive resources is highest (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989).
Research from the neuroscience literature also supports the negative effect
of goals on performance in some situations. In a study looking at dynamic
decision making, participants were asked to either predict or control the health of
an infant. During the learning phase of the task, participants were given outcome
feedback based on their performance. Unexpectedly, this feedback was found to
impair learning and transfer (Osman, 2012). The author suggested that the
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negative effect of feedback was a result of the nature of the task presented; a
caution regarding the value of feedback that has been supported by others (e.g.,
Harvey, 2011; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). Specifically, for complex judgment and
decision making tasks, such as dynamic decision making, decision-makers engage
in constant learning, as decisions are impacted by previous decisions and other
factors within the task environment. More specifically, in dynamic decision
making tasks (such as resource allocation), decision-makers will be required to
constantly use the feedback provided to develop new knowledge—a process
called exploration—and use their existing knowledge to make the decisions
required of the task being completed—a process called exploitation (Harvey,
2011). For example, while managing time between a main goal (e.g., improving
teaching performance), and other priorities, receiving weekly feedback on goal
progress throughout the quarter will be cognitively expensive. In other words,
reassessing and redistributing effort based on ongoing feedback increases the
cognitive load associated with these tasks which may ultimately impair
performance. This is especially likely if an individual’s cognitive resources are
limited (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989).
Given that top-down processing is associated with goal-driven cognitive
processes, this may include the regulation of goal-related information such as
feedback on goal progress. As such, rather than relying on top-down attentional
regulation exclusively, there may be some benefit to exploring an alternative
strategy for effective resource allocation for certain individuals.
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Bottom-up regulation of attention.
Bottom-up regulation, or exogenous control (Posner, 1980), is driven by
features related to the stimulus in question (Pashler et al., 2001). Further,
regulation based on this type of process often results in attention being captured
by features of the stimulus that “pop out” based on their dissimilarity with the
other features in the stimulus environment (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Using
visual attention to illustrate, using bottom-up regulation, an item will be more
likely to command one’s attention if its features or colors are distinct from that of
its background. Similarly, a dominant bottom-up approach would result in task
prioritization based on task-related factors including identified discrepancies
between one’s current and desired goal progress or time to task completion (Lord
& Levy, 1994), rather than consideration of the macro-level goals. As such, an
individual may decide to focus on task A over B because task A is closer to being
completed (i.e., less time intensive) even if task B is more in-line with a
superordinate goal. Being stimulus-driven, bottom-up attention may be
involuntarily directed (Schreij, Owens, & Theeuwes, 2008). For example, an
employee may commit unplanned time or attention to handling emergency
situations at work. This may include completing tasks that are not directly related
to meeting an established goal but require attention nonetheless.
This approach to attentional regulation resembles the ‘consume and check’
(CAC) strategy. The CAC strategy involves some initial planning at the beginning
of tasks but follows with daily “consumption” of resources and constant checking
to avoid over- or under-use of available resources as time processes (Ball et al.,
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1998). The CAC strategy equates to choosing a task on the first day of the week
and constantly checking progress to the resources available as the week
progresses to consume the final share of resources. This implies a routine-like
nature of consuming and checking resources (i.e., satisfy current needs), in
comparison to the more cognitively complex process of solving and scheduling
(i.e., seeking to maximize resources). In comparison to the SAS strategy, the CAC
strategy may be more data-limited (i.e., performance is independent of resource
processing; Norman & Bobrow, 1975). Specifically, using the CAC strategy may
rely less on the cognitive resources given the routine-nature and less complex
process involved. Additionally, the CAC strategy may be considered more
responsive than proactive (Gonzalez et al., 2002). At the same time, the success of
this strategy depends on the manner in which allocation decisions are made in the
moment.
Using the CAC strategy, in comparison to the SAS strategy, individuals
have demonstrated an inability to meet overall goals due to allocation errors at the
end of the tasks. Specifically, using a meal-scheduling task, some participants
were unable to consume the minimum daily meal required on the last day of the
week as a result of over-consumption earlier in the week (Ball et al., 1998). This
implies that the approach utilized during the decision making process may be a
function of perception and judgment.
Comparison of top-down and bottom-up allocation.
A number of differences have been identified between behaviors
associated with top-down and bottom up attention. For example, top down visual
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attention is described as sustained and takes longer to deploy than its transient
bottom-up alternative (Pinto, van der Leij, Sligte, Lamme, & Scholte, 2013).
Within the domain of resource allocation specifically, findings appear to suggest
differences in allocation as influenced by attentional focus. On one hand, while
working on multiple goals, participants’ goal priorities were influenced by a
discrepancy between their current and desired goal progress—a bottom-up
influence (e.g., Schmidt & DeShon, 2007). That is, participants prioritized the
task with the greater discrepancy. On the other hand, participants may also
prioritize whichever task is closer to being completed (Kernan & Lord, 1990), a
demonstration of a top-down attention. This difference was suggested as being
attributable to the nature of the tasks used by the researchers in the studies
reported (Schmidt et al., 2009). A bottom-up influence was believed to be in
response to the dynamic task used (Schmidt & DeShon, 2007) while a top-down
influence a function of the static task used (Kernan & Lord, 1990). This
difference in allocation pattern has also varied based on goal orientation. To be
exact, those with a high mastery orientation (i.e., individuals who want to increase
competence; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) generally prioritize based on large goal
discrepancy while those with a high performance avoid orientation (i.e.,
individuals who want to avoid negative judgments; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) are
more likely to allocate attention to goals close to completion (i.e., least discrepant;
Schmidt et al., 2009). These findings suggest that inter-individual factors can
influence resource allocation patterns. In addition to allocation behavior, any
associated performance differences are also of concern.
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In the seminal work conducted by Ball and colleagues (1998), which aided
the identification of the CAC and SAS resource allocation strategies, a few
differences were observed between the verbal protocols of participants, using the
CAC and SAS strategies. First, it was noticed that the majority of participants
used the CAC strategy (71%). Others have also found the use of the CAC
strategy more common among participants and have attributed this difference to
CAC being a less cognitively complex approach (Gonzalez et al., 2002). Second,
participants using the SAS strategy had better performance than those using the
CAC strategy in less complex resource allocation tasks. There were no differences
between strategies (i.e., on performance) when the task was more complex.
However, given the sample size (i.e., 20 participants) used in the study, additional
research is warranted as this absence of an effect may have been due to a lack of
power.
Research has also attempted to determine whether people are capable of
solving resource allocation decisions in an optimal manner (e.g., similar to the LP
approach). Evidence suggests that under certain conditions (i.e., certainty, risk)
individuals are able to identify optimal solutions. Of those participants who
identified the optimal solution, all used the SAS strategy (Gonzalez et al., 2002).
This further supports the idea that the SAS strategy may be superior to the CAC
strategy. Given the limited attention to these “intuitive” (e.g., SAS and CAC)—in
comparison to mathematical strategies (i.e., LP)—in resource allocation decision
making (Ball et al., 1998), additional work continues to examine more intuitive
allocation strategies. Specifically, as referenced above, research has begun to
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explore the individual differences associated with different allocation behaviors
(e.g., Schmidt et al., 2009). This proposed research continues this trend toward a
focus on individual differences by examining the effect of working memory.
Working Memory Capacity
Attention directs cognitive resources to selected activities or tasks, and
working memory aids this process. Working memory is a cognitively-based
individual difference that actively preserves small pieces of information to be
utilized during cognitive task activities (Cowan et al., 2005). Working memory
biases attention to prioritized activities (Lavie et al., 2004) and is related to the
ability to focus on goal-relevant information (Redick & Engle, 2006). In other
words, working memory mirrors executive control (Engle, 2002). Therefore, this
construct is relevant to resource allocation as it may facilitate the ability to
maintain attention and ignore distractions during task performance. In fact, within
the multitasking literature, the dimensions of working memory capacity predict
both performance speed and error (Buhner, Konig, Pick, & Krumm, 2006).
Therefore, in this study, it is expected that working memory capacity will affect
both performance efficiency (i.e., time to completion) and accuracy (i.e., absence
of errors). To better understand how working memory capacity plays a role in
affecting these performance outcomes, it is important to understand the
dimensions and structure of working memory.
Working memory includes three primary dimensions: storage in the
context of processing, coordination, and supervision (Oberauer, Sub, Wilhelm, &
Wittman, 2003). Storage in the context of processing is the ability to briefly retain
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information even after presented. This is useful within the context of resource
allocation for the maintenance of performance over time. Namely, should a
stimulus-driven factor, such as an emergency e-mail at work, require the need to
pause from working on a goal-directed activity, the ability to retain information
from the primary task may help to preserve performance when returning to the
task. Therefore, the benefit that high working memory capacity has on multitasking performance may be extended to resource allocation performance. The
second dimension of working memory is coordination, which refers to the ability
to “build relations between elements and to integrate relations into structures”
(Oberauer et al., 2003, p. 169). This dimension may also be useful if switching
between tasks to integrate activities to improve efficiency. For example, if
allocating attention between two writing projects, it would be helpful to
coordinate the writing process between these distinct projects in such a way as to
allow working on one to facilitate, rather than inhibit, working on the other.
Finally, supervision, the third dimension of working memory, is related to
monitoring activities to ensure that relevant tasks are prioritized and irrelevant
tasks do not cause a distraction.
With regards to the structure of working memory, four primary systems
have been identified: the central executive, the phonological loop, the visuospatial
sketchpad, and the episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2003). The central executive is the
most critical system and effects control via: a) patterns or schemas which are
influenced by environmental cues, and b) the supervisory activating system which
intervenes when control processes are lacking (Baddeley, 2003). Therefore, the
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central executive is implicated when behavior is driven by superordinate mental
constructs such as goals—this speaks to the first role of the central executive.
However, when cognitive resources are limited, the central executive may also
function to influence behavior by supervising the actions of its supporting
systems. These supporting systems include the phonological loop and the
visuospatial sketchpad. The phonological loop is the system of sound processing
that supports the acquisition of language (Baddeley, Gathercole, & Papagno,
1998) and is responsible for temporarily storing phonological information to
memory using a rehearsal process; similarly, the visuospatial sketchpad stores and
manipulates visual and spatial information for short periods (Baddeley, 2003).
Finally, the episodic buffer, (Baddeley, 2000) facilitates integration between the
phonological loop, the visuospatial sketchpad, and long-term memory (Baddeley,
2003). See Figure 1 for a visual representation of the systems involved in working
memory.
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Central
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Visual/Spatial

Figure 1. The multi-component model of working memory. Adapted from
Baddeley (2003).

The role of working memory in the allocation of attention.
Working memory is an important predictor of performance in situations
requiring multi-task performance (Hambrick, Oswald, Darowiski, Rench, & Brou,
2010; Konig, Buhner, & Murling, 2005). Additionally, working memory predicts
the likelihood of exercising more cognitive control (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, &
Engle, 2001), the likelihood of multi-tasking (Sanbonmatsu, Strayer, MedeirosWard, & Watson, 2013), and the ability to avoid interference (Kane & Engle,
2003). Recent meta-analytic evidence also suggests that limited working memory
capacity is associated with an increased likelihood of mind wandering, which
ultimately reduces performance (Randall, et al., 2014). Given that top-down
processing is associated with more cognitive-based regulation (Pashler et al,
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2001), it seems reasonable to expect an association between high working
memory capacity and top-down processing (Sobel, Gerrie, Poole, & Kane, 2007)
Furthermore, working memory capacity is associated with enhanced
performance on tasks related to ignoring distractions (e.g., Sobel et al., 2007). For
example, using a visual search task, search efficiency was not influenced for
subjects relying on bottom-up processes but was enhanced for those relying on
top-down processes (Sobel et al, 2007). A possible explanation for this could be
that bottom-up processes are facilitated by stimulus-related factors while topdown processes are more heavily reliant on cognitive resources such as working
memory. As such, we may expect to find an association between top-down
attention, high working memory capacity, and performance within the context of
resource allocation.
In the preceding review, I provided an overview of the general principles
of resource theory. Additionally, I narrowed in on the regulation of attention and
highlighted the role of working memory in the process. Limits to working
memory capacity interfere with the appropriate regulation of attention, which
poses a challenge for successful task performance in work environments that
require multitasking. A reliance on working memory capacity is likely to increase
as jobs increase in complexity and workload. Therefore, identifying
environmental factors that interact with working memory capacity to affect
performance in these conditions is important. The allocation of attention is
heavily dependent on judgment and decision making processes. For example,
having identified that working on my dissertation is presently my most important
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goal, directing my attention to preparing an activity for the class I am teaching for
a portion of my day today involves an active decision of not doing one thing and
doing another instead. While several decision making frameworks exist that may
provide a viable suggestion to the resource allocation dilemma, I will apply the
naturalistic decision making model.
Naturalistic Decision Making
Within the tradition of decision making research, several recent dominant
paradigms have influenced theoretical and practical applications (Highhouse,
Dalal, & Salas 2014). One is bounded rationality (Simon, 1972), which highlights
the limits of human cognition and influenced research on heuristics and biases
(i.e., Kahneman’s & Tversky’s work). Another is adaptive decision making,
including the Brunswick lens model (i.e., Hammond, 1955), and research from the
ABC group suggesting that the “fast and frugal” nature of heuristics can enhance
decision making (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). A third approach focuses
on real-life decision making, influenced by more dynamic realities. One example
of this approach is naturalistic decision making (Lipshitz et al., 2001).
Naturalistic decision making seeks to “understand how people make
decisions in real-world contexts that are meaningful and familiar to them”
(Lipshitz et al., 2001, p. 332). This approach to decision making responds to the
shortcomings of traditional decision making approaches that are incompatible
with the uncertainty associated with organizational life (Grossman et al., 2014).
This supports the applicability of a naturalistic decision making model to the
problem of resource allocation. To be precise, typical work situations are believed
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to include some uncertainty and be dynamic in nature—thereby complicating the
decisions about where and how attention should be allocated. For example, going
back to the opening example - consider that Beth has prioritized the goal of
completing the edits needed for the revise and resubmit. This task may support the
goal she has of increasing her research productivity.
However, applying a traditional decision making framework—prospect
theory which models real-life choices, for example—a question exists of how she
would determine the value of the potential gain to be achieved from completing
this task when there is no guarantee that completing the edits will result in her
paper being accepted for publication. Additionally, further uncertainty relates to
how she would quickly and accurately weight the value of revising one paper
versus another to decide which to prioritize. Therefore, while more recent models
of decision making deviated from the classical or rational choice model of
decision making where decision-makers were assumed to be rational thinkers, an
understanding of decision making in more dynamic contexts is still warranted
(Lipshitz et al., 2001). The limitation of applying traditional decision making
theories to explain how we allocate attention is therefore challenging given the
dynamic nature of resource allocation.
Consequently, naturalistic decision making might be a good fit for
explaining and enhancing allocation decisions. Eight distinguishing features are
typical of naturalistic decision making contexts. These include: ill-structured
problems, uncertain and dynamic environments, shifting and ill-defined or
competing goals, action/feedback loops, time constraints, high stakes, multiple
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players, and organizational goals and norms (Orassanu & Connolly, 1993).
Applying naturalistic decision making to a situation requires that some—not
necessarily all—of these contextual features are present (Grossman et al., 2014).
Additionally, naturalistic decision making relies heavily on experience. That is,
decision-makers are required to have some amount of knowledge of the decision
domain (Lipshitz et al., 2001). This facilitates a critical component as decisionmakers engage in a matching process between cues within their existing and
previous decision environments (Grossman et al., 2014). As this relates to
resource allocation, I suggest that this reliance on cues further supports the
relevance of naturalistic decision making to resource allocation decisions as it
provides the possibility of enhancing allocation decision through the practice of
training.
There are four essential characteristics of naturalistic decision making that
distinguishes it from other decision making frameworks. The first is that
naturalistic decision making is process-oriented (Lipshitz et al., 2001). This
means that rather than proposing the appropriate alternative in a choice situation,
the naturalistic model describes the decision process. Therefore, applying
naturalistic decision making to resource allocation would focus on identifying the
type of information focused on to arrive at decisions about what to prioritize. By
knowing this, attempts can be made to provide this information in order to prime
more appropriate allocation decisions. The second characteristic is the use of
situation-action matching decision rules (e.g., “Do A because it is appropriate for
situation S”; Lipshitz et al., 2001; p. 334). This has an important implication to

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

34

resource allocation decisions. Explicitly, if we are able to identify appropriate
matching rules for ideal allocations, this can help to facilitate superior
performance and help to avoid erroneous allocations. Given that the resource
allocation process is fundamentally dynamic (Atkinson & Birch, 1978),
naturalistic decision making may help to guide appropriate task switching as
called for by the work situation. Third, naturalistic decision making is contextbound which further supports the value of domain-specific experience (Lipshitz et
al., 2001). The final characteristic is that naturalistic decision making facilitates
empirically-based prescriptions (Lipshitz et al., 2001). This means that optimal
allocation decisions would be based on evidence of previously successful
allocations. The third and fourth characteristics reinforce the value of expertise or
prior experience within the decision-domain. This leads to the question of what
underlining features of experience support naturalistic decision making.
Cues aiding naturalistic decision making.
To better appreciate the underlining factors of influence during naturalistic
decision making, it is helpful to understand a specific type of naturalistic decision
making model—recognition-primed decision making (RPD; Klein, 1998). RPD
involves categorizing a situation as similar to other situations in the past and
finding a course of action by predicting the outcome. RPD includes three
variations of “if: then” reactions (Klein, 1998). The first variation occurs when the
situation is clear and the decision-maker has a fair understanding of both the
stimulus and the outcome. The second and third variations occur when the
decision maker is uncertain about either the stimulus situation or outcome. In
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order to decide under uncertain conditions, expert decision-makers often rely on
cues (Klein, 1998). The reliance on cues in decision making represents a
simplification method used by decision makings in complex situations (Lant &
Hewlin, 2002).
The use of cues to facilitate decision making has been shown to be an
effective strategy. Based on schema theory, people develop cognitive
representations of the information they process, which helps provide rules to
direct behavior (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). Cues may therefore help to increase
efficiency in complex allocation situations, as they can provide guidelines based
on previous experience. Further, the use of cues also helps enhance situational
awareness (Grossman et al., 2014). Situational awareness is knowledge of one’s
environment; including an understanding of the meaning and status that each
element presents (Endsley & Garland, 2000). This has some implication to
resource allocation in situations where multiple elements are competing for one’s
attention. That is to say, by having adequate awareness of one’s situation, a better
determination can be made about the meaning and relevance of any “distractors”
presented. Therefore, less time should be lost on tasks that detract from the
accomplishment of one’s main goal, as with better situational awareness only
critical off-tasks will be attended to.
Related to the discussion of working memory above, working memory is
responsible for cue-based processing, coordination, and control (Baddeley, 2003;
Oberauer et al., 2003). Further, working memory capacity also predicts how
individuals attend to information. Specifically, those with low working memory
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capacity are more likely to attend to off-task activities (Kane & Engle, 2003).
Consequently, relying on working memory to facilitate this cue-based processing
may only further reduce working memory capacity. Therefore, before
implementing resource allocation cues in an attempt to support better allocation
decisions, it may be useful to first explore the effectiveness of different types of
cues in light of differences in working memory capacity. Explicitly, might those
with low working memory capacity benefit more from a certain type of cue? I
propose that cues presented from the bottom-up (i.e., task or stimulus level)
require less cognitive effort for those with low working memory capacity,
considering that they have less top-down cognitive control than people with high
working memory capacity (Redick & Engle, 2006).
Therefore, I predict that working memory capacity will influence
sensitivity to the source of cues. To be exact, those with high working memory
capacity will effectively allocate resources when provided with cues at the level
of the goal (e.g., feedback on goal progress facilitating self-regulation) or, at the
level of the goal along with cues on the task (e.g., information on priority of offtasks), because they possess the cognitive resources needed to both self-regulate
and maintain cognitive control (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Conversely, those
with low working memory capacity will demonstrate more effective performance
in situations of competing attentional demands when provided with cues at the
level of the task as the instantaneous nature of these cues will command more
attention when working memory capacity is low (Kane & Engle, 2003). Further,
when individuals with low working memory capacity are given both task- and
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goal-focused cues, the presence of both cues will impair performance as
processing information from both cues will command more cognitive resources
which low working memory individuals lack (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). In this
study, task-related cues should reduce the cognitive demands on low working
memory individuals by reducing the need to consciously make judgments about
whether they should switch their attention to the off-task activity. Allocation
cueing that encourages attending to whether an off-task activity is critical should
provide help (in comparison to cueing a goal monitoring focus), rather than hurt
low working memory individuals. Therefore, providing salient or clear
information on whether a secondary or off-task demand requires attention may
help those with low working memory capacity allocate their attention
appropriately. In sum, it is expected that cueing those with high working memory
at the goal and goal and task levels will result in a) more time on a goal-related
task and, b) better performance on a goal-related task. Conversely, cueing
individuals with low working memory capacity at the task level will result in a)
more time on a goal-related task and b) better performance on a goal-related task.
See Figure 2 for the full conceptual model of the proposed relationships.
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Figure 2. Conceptual Model Depicting the Proposed Moderated-Mediated
Relationship between Cue Type, Working Memory, Time on Task, and
Performance.
Rationale
The proposed study contributes to the understanding of resource allocation
performance from a decision making perspective. Naturalistic decision making,
while mostly applied to emergency contexts (e.g., Carvalho, dos Santos, & Vidal,
2005), has some promise for more typical decision making contexts (Grossman et
al., 2014). The resource allocation context is believed to be one such context
given its dynamism (Atkinson & Birch, 1978). The proposed research applies the
principles of naturalistic decision making and seeks to determine if working
memory capacity moderates the relationship between allocation cues and
performance in the resource allocation context.
The results from this study have two primary implications. First, this study
applies naturalistic decision making to a prototypical work context. While
naturalistic decision making is believed to be valuable outside of contexts related
to firefighting, the military, aviation, and medical decision making (Grossman et
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al., 2014), very little research has applied naturalistic decision making to
prototypical working settings such as office environments. Factors such as greater
autonomy, technological advancements, and increases in the distributed nature of
work (Goodwin, Burke, Wildman, & Salas, 2009; Wood, 2011) present a very
complex environment for resource allocation and, as such, naturalistic decision
making may provide some value in understanding allocation decisions. This value
can be enhanced through proper task-related training directed at managing
multiple demands which leads to the second major contribution of this research.
Second, by identifying the differential effects of resource allocation cues
on resource allocation, targeted work design or training can be implemented to
take advantage of these effects. That is, if those with low working memory
capacity show more effective performance when given allocation cues at the task
level, work or training design could provide targeted interventions to help
individuals with low working memory to perform in resource allocation contexts.
For example, this research may suggest that cueing low working memory capacity
employees to attend to task features may be more effective than a focus on goals
in situations where task distractions are highly likely. As another practical
application, training based on the principles of naturalistic decision making can
take several approaches. One promising training format which facilitates cue
recognition is situation awareness training (Grossman et al., 2014). Situational
awareness refers to the ability to perceive features of the environment and to
comprehend the meaning of these features (Endsley, 1995). This research will
help to provide support regarding the types of cues best capable to facilitate this
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awareness based on working memory differences. In addition to cue recognition
or situational awareness training, another practical implication that this research
may provide concerns the provision of resource allocation cues in the work
environment. If the hypothesis that task-level cues are more effective than goallevel cues for individuals with low working memory, then attempts to make tasklevel cues more salient or clear may also provide some advantages. The
hypotheses are summarized below.
Statement of Hypotheses
Hypothesis I: There will be a positive relationship between working memory
capacity and time spent on task such that, participants with higher working
memory capacity will spend more time on the task (i.e., be less distracted by the
e-mails).
Hypothesis II: There will be a positive relationship between time spent on task
and performance in terms of (a) accuracy and (b) efficiency such that, participants
with higher working memory capacity will be more accurate and more efficient.
Hypothesis III: The relationship between cue type and performance (a) accuracy
and (b) efficiency will be partially mediated by time on primary task.
Hypothesis IV: Working memory will moderate the effect of cue type on time
spent on the primary task. Specifically,
(a) As working memory increases, individuals who are exposed to the goalfocused cue or both goal- and task-focused cues will spend more time on
the task than individuals exposed to the task-focused cue.
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(b) As working memory decreases, individuals exposed to task cues will
spend more time on the task than individuals exposed to the goal-focused
cue or both goal- and task-focused cues.
Hypothesis V: Working memory will moderate the effect of cue type on
performance in terms of (a) accuracy and (b) efficiency. Specifically,
(a) As working memory increases, individuals who are exposed to the goalfocused cue or both goal- and task-focused cues will demonstrate higher
performance in terms of (a) accuracy and (b) efficiency on the task than
individuals exposed to the task-focused cue.
(b) As working memory decreases, individuals exposed to task cues will
demonstrate higher performance in terms of (a) accuracy and (b)
efficiency on the task than individuals exposed to the goal-focused cue or
both goal- and task-focused cues.
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PART II
Method

Overview
A one-way independent samples experimental design with four conditions
was used to examine the hypotheses. Specifically, the independent variable, cue
type, was manipulated to include four levels: task level cue, goal level cue, both
task and goal level cues, and no cue. Working memory was measured as an
individual difference moderator variable. Attention was operationalized as the
proportion of time spent on the primary task, and was examined as a potential
mediator of the working memory and cue type effect on performance. The
dependent variable was performance, which was operationalized in two ways: a)
accuracy (correct responses) and b) efficiency (time to completion). General
mental ability, task-specific self-efficacy, goal orientation, conscientiousness,
experience with the task software (Excel), and baseline performance were
examined as covariates.
Participants
Participants were undergraduates enrolled in Introduction to Psychology
(PSY 105 & 106) at a large, private Midwestern University. Participants received
2.5 credits for their participation (.5 for an online pre-measure and 2.0 for the
experiment). Participants from all demographic background (e.g., gender, race)
were allowed to participate; however, all participants were at least 18 years old. In
total, 484 participants completed the pre-measure (part 1); of that number, 235
also completed the experiment (part 2). Given that participants were required to
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complete both parts 1 and 2, 235 was the qualified sample size for hypothesis
testing. After data preparation and screening, the total sample included in study
analyses was reduced to 166 participants; this is further discussed in the section
describing the data screening process. Of the participants who were included in
the analyses, 79.5% self-identified as female and 19.9% as male. The average age
of participants was 19.72 (SD = 2.48). Regarding racial background, 58.4% of the
participants reported being Caucasian/White, 19.9% as Hispanic or of Spanish
origin, 13.9% as Asian/Pacific Islander, 6.6% as Black/African American, and
.6% as American Indian or Alaska native. In terms of employment status, 53.6%
of participants reported being not employed, while 41.6% were employed parttime, and 4.2% had fulltime employment. Finally, regarding years of work
experience, 25.3% of the sample had 5-10 years of work experience.
Task Description
The experimental task was a procedural knowledge Excel task previously
used to assess trainer effects (e.g., Towler et al., 2008; see Appendix A). The task
involved using Microsoft Excel to conduct calculations, formatting, filtering, and
creating charts using a dataset on the lifestyle choices of college students. The
task included seven questions that participants were asked to complete.
Participants were given 15 minutes to complete the task. The primary task was
scored out of a total of 36 points based on the number of correct responses.
The lab task also included a distractor activity (see Appendix B), which
was attending to e-mails. During the task, participants received a series of e-mails
intended to simulate a work environment whereby a secondary activity competed
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for the allocation of attention from a primary task. Participants received a total of
8 e-mails. The e-mails served no task-related purpose and were solely intended to
distract participants from the experimental task (example e-mail titles included:
“Discover the meaning and history behind your last name” and “Sign up for
additional Experiments on Sona Systems”. Participants were told that they were
free to attend to these e-mails if they wished to do so. The e-mails were selected
to be attractive enough in nature so as to elicit the attention of participants away
from the main task. As participants worked on completing the task, e-mails were
received via a dedicated Microsoft Outlook e-mail account whereby on receipt of
an e-mail, a visual notification to the lower right hand corner as well as an
auditory notification by headphone was received. Participants were instructed to
wear headphones during the task; this was done to increase the likelihood of
participants noticing the e-mails.
Study Manipulation
Independent variable: Cue type was manipulated to include goal, task,
task and goal, or no cue. The cues were intended to prime participants to engage
in either top-down (i.e., goal-focused), bottom- up (i.e., task-focused), or both
types of attention allocation strategies. In other words, participants in the goal cue
condition were primed to attend the experimental activities based on their goal
(e.g., goal progress); conversely, participants in the task cue condition were
primed to attend to activities based on features at the task level (e.g., criticality),
and finally, participants receiving both task and goal cues were primed to engage
in both types of allocation strategies. In total, 39 participants were included in
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goal cue condition, 44 were in the task cue condition, 41 were in the goal and task
cue condition, and 42 participants were in the control group.
Participants in the goal cue condition (i.e., top-down attention) were given
a paragraph describing the importance of top-down thinking. The paragraph (see
Appendix C) provided an explanation of what top-down processing means, a
description the value of processing from the top down (i.e., maintaining a focus
on a goal) and two recommendations for using this strategy when deciding how to
allocate attention while completing the task (e.g., considering how close one is to
a goal). Essentially, participants were primed to focus on allocating their attention
based on an overarching goal. Participants in this condition were also asked to set
a goal for themselves after reading the instructions. The purpose of setting this
goal was to give participants a frame of reference for regulating their attention as
they worked on completing the task.
Likewise, participants in the task cue condition (i.e., bottom–up attention)
were given a paragraph describing bottom-up thinking (see Appendix C). The
paragraph provided an explanation of bottom-up processing, a description of its
benefit (i.e., attending to critical or urgent information) and two recommendations
for using this strategy when deciding how to allocate attention while completing
the task (e.g., quickly scan e-mail title to determine relevance). Participants were
primed to allocate their attention based on the nature of the e-mails received.
Participants in the both task and goal cue condition received both paragraphs in
their instructions.
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Manipulation check. Each manipulation was followed by a series of
questions assessing participants’ understanding of the description of the strategies
and a question about a self-set goal for participants in the goal-focused condition.
These questions served as the manipulation check (see Appendix C). Twelve
participants failed the manipulation check by failing to provide the correct
responses. These participants were excluded from the analyses.
Procedure
Participants completed a two-step process as part of their participation in
the study. First, using Sona System, participants sign up to participate in the
study. They were given a description of the research and the requirements for the
two-part nature of the study. Participants then had the option to complete the first
online portion (after reviewing the informed consent; Appendix D) which
included the pre-test measures of: a) conscientiousness, b) goal orientation, c)
experience with Microsoft Office platforms (i.e., Word, PowerPoint) within
which was embedded a measure of experience with Excel, and d) the
demographic measure (Appendix E). Participants received half a credit (.5) for
completing these measures. In order to create a unique identifier to link data from
the online pre-test to the second portion (i.e., lab data), participants were
instructed to create a unique password that they were required to take with them
to the lab if they so desired to participate in the second portion of the study.
Participants then had the option of signing up for the lab session—participation in
the lab session was not required, therefore, there was some attrition between the
first and second components of the study.
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Prior to the participants’ arrival to the lab for the second portion of the
study a random condition assignment software was used to create a series of
participant ID numbers based on the four experimental conditions. Numbers were
then assigned to participants chronologically (e.g., 0001A, 0002C, 0003A, 0004D,
0004B). On their arrival to the lab, participants were asked to review an informed
consent document (Appendix F). To ensure that participants had a clear
understanding of the general purpose of the study, and the benefits and risks
associated with participation, participants were asked three general questions
based on information presented on the informed consent. Participants who failed
to respond correctly were redirected to the informed consent before signing. Once
signed, participants were then directed to the Qualtrics survey which housed the
measures to be completed during the lab session. This survey had links to the
working memory and general mental ability measures. Before accessing the
survey, participants were required to submit the password that they created at the
end of the pre-lab measures. Next, participants were given their unique participant
ID number to enter at the beginning of the working memory and general mental
ability measures. They were also required to enter this number at the end of the
Qualtrics survey. Therefore, all measures could be linked using this participant ID
that also allowed easy tracking of condition assignment.
In the lab, participants first completed a) an online working memory test,
and b) a timed general mental ability test. Following this, participants completed a
15-minute training to become acquainted with the Excel task (Towler et al.,
2008). The training was facilitated by a pedagogical agent-led video created for
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the task. After watching the video, participants completed a brief recall measure
to assess their understanding of the training material; this measure served as a
measure of baseline performance (see Appendix G). Next, participants read the
instructions for the tasks. Instructions varied based on the study manipulation and
was followed by the manipulation check (see Appendix C). Next, participants
completed a task-specific self-efficacy measure (see Appendix H). Finally, they
began the performance task (Towler et al.).
Participants were given 15 minutes to complete the task. This is less than
the 25 minutes typically given to complete this task in prior studies (e.g., Mann,
Mitchell, Brown, & Towler, 2013; Mitchell, Brown, Mann, & Towler, 2014).
Participants were given this reduced time limit to make the task more challenging.
During the task, eight e-mails were sent to participants from a dedicated Gmail
account. E-mails were sent by the research assistant every 1.5 minute starting 1
minute into the task. The e-mails were sent to all participants in the same order.
Participants received these e-mails to a Microsoft Outlook account configured to
the machine they were working on. Microsoft Outlook allowed e-mails to “pop
up” at the lower right hand corner of the screen providing both a visual and
auditory notification. While working on the computer and switching between the
task and e-mails, the time tracking software, ManicTime, ran in the background to
track participants’ attention between the Microsoft Excel and Outlook
applications. The program tracked time based on application opened, mouse
clicks, and keyboard use.
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Participants were told when they had 5 minutes remaining on the task and
were instructed to stop after 15 minutes. For participants who completed the task
before 15 minutes, the time taken to complete the task was recorded. Once
completed, participants were instructed to save their working file and directed to
the Qualtrics to read the study debrief (see Appendix I).
Measures
Moderator: Working memory was measured using the Operational span
(O-Span) task developed by Bryan Edwards and Ana Franco-Watkins. This task is
similar to the one developed by the Engle laboratory for use with the E-prime
software (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). O-span is a test of working
memory capacity that assesses the associated processing and storage of
information (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Turner & Engle,
1989). The O-span correlates with other measures of working memory capacity
(Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002). This measure was
convenient as it facilitated accessible online testing via a URL through the
Franco-Watkins lab. This test consisted of sets of mathematical problems (e.g.,
8/4 + 3 =7?) coupled with letter strings. First, participants practiced each task, and
then they practiced solving the mathematical problems while storing the letters to
memory. In total, there are 75 math/letter pairs; 12 sets were used in this task. A
working memory score was determined based on the total number of correctly
recalled letters in the correct position while maintaining accuracy (85% or
greater) on the mathematical problems. The O-span adapted to each participant's
time to solve the mathematical problems presented. This measure lasted for

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

50

approximately 10-15 minutes (self-paced). Appendix J contains screenshots of the
working memory test. Participants could receive scores ranging from 0-50 points
on the working memory measure. On average, participants had a working
memory score of 34.97 (SD = 9.17).
Control variables. To help to control the influence of individual
differences known to have an effect of performance, data was collected on general
mental ability (GMA), conscientiousness, goal orientation, task self-efficacy, and
prior experience with Microsoft Excel. To assess GMA, participants completed
the Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT-R) in which they completed as many of 50
items possible in 8 minutes. Past research has found test-retest reliability of .82.94 and alternate-forms reliability coefficients of .73-.95 (Geisinger, 2001). In
relation to validity, the test demonstrated predictive validation across jobs with
values of .22-.67 and correlates with the WAIS Full Scale IQ and the General
Aptitude Test Battery's "Aptitude G" (r = .70-.92; Geisinger, 2001). On average,
participants had a general mental ability score of 23.55 (SD = 3.28), out of a
potential range of 0-50.
Within the domain of personality, conscientiousness has generally shown
the most promise as a predictor of job performance (r = .25, Barrick & Mount,
1991; r = .31, Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Conscientiousness was measured using
the conscientiousness sub-scale from the International Personality Item Pool
(IPIP; Goldberg et al., 2006; Appendix K). The IPIP’s conscientious subscale
reports coefficient alphas ranging from .71-.85. The scale also correlates with the
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NEO Personality Inventory (r = .60 - .76; Goldberg et al., 2006). In this study,
data collected with the IPIP conscientiousness scale had a coefficient alpha of .86.
Data were also collected on goal orientation given its observed effect in
previous resource allocation research (Schmidt et al., 2009). Goal orientation was
measured using a 13-item instrument on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (VandeWalle, Cron, & Slocum, 2001;
Appendix L). The instrument also showed high internal consistency in this study
with acceptable coefficient alphas for learning (.77), avoid (.76), and prove goal
orientation (.76), respectively. Task-specific self-efficacy, which has a moderate
to strong relationship with self-regulated learning, was also measured as a control
variable (Sitzmann & Ely, 2011). Task-specific self-efficacy was measured using
an adapted scale from prior research which contains 4 items assessing confidence
in the ability to complete the task (De Guinea & Webster, 2011; Appendix H).
Sample item includes: “I feel confident that I can carry out the Excel task”. The
measure shows good reliability (α = .90; De Guinea & Webster, 2011). Scale
items were assessed using a 1-100 response scale (0 = no confidence; 100 =
completely confident) to be consistent with recommendations from Bandura
(2006). In the current study, the scale demonstrated very high internal consistency
(α = .98).
Baseline performance was assessed using a 13-item recall test often used
with the task in previous research. The test was given after the 15-minute training
video was viewed by the participants and was objectively scored based on an
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answer sheet. On average, participants had a pretest score of 8.04 (SD = 2.28).
The recall test can be found in Appendix G.
Experience with Excel was also accessed by asking participants how
frequently they use Microsoft Excel (Towler et al., 2008). This measure was
included in the pre-test survey with questions about the frequency of use of other
Microsoft products so as to reduce the likelihood of participants predicting the
task for the study before coming to the lab (Appendix M). Thirty-two percent of
the participants reported having no experience using Microsoft Excel.
Mediator: Proportion of time spent on task was used as a proxy for
attention. Time was recorded in seconds using the ManicTime software. This
software automatically monitors and records computer usage by tracking time
spent, in seconds, using different applications, working on documents, and
visiting various websites. The data is date- and time-stamped and stored to the
local machine (not cloud-based) which facilitates offline tracking (see Appendix
N for a screen shot of the data logged using ManicTime). This program was
selected instead of a keyboard logger—which tracks key presses or mouse
movement—as it is assumed that participants may be attending to the Excel file or
e-mails by looking at the screen without interacting with the keyboard for a
duration of seconds. At the same time, ManicTime does not distinguish between
cases in which participants simply have a file or e-mail open but are not actively
attending to the information (e.g., not looking at the screen, reading). As such,
research assistants were instructed to monitor participants to make a note of
participants who appear inattentive to the task. No participant was reported as
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displaying behavior indicating disengagement during the task (e.g., staring off
into space for a significant period of time).
Given the preciseness (i.e., time in seconds) of the time measurement and
the presence of minor variations in task length, attention was operationalized as
the proportion of time spent on task. Proportion was calculated as time on task
divided by total time (time on task plus e-mail). See Table 1 for means and
standard deviations for proportion of time spent on task by study condition.
Dependent variable: Performance outcome was determined in two
ways: a) accuracy and b) efficiency. Accuracy was calculated based on correct
responses to each item. The correct responses were indicated on an answer sheet
prepared for the task (Towler et al., 2008). Accuracy was calculated as an
aggregate of scores from the primary task (36 points).
Efficiency was determined based on the amount of time taken to complete
the task. Participants who completed the task, before the allotted 15 minutes,
received efficiency points based on the number of seconds they had remaining at
the time of task completion. For example, a participant who completed the task in
10 minutes received 300 efficiency points while a participant who completed the
task in 14 minutes received 60 points for efficiency. That is, participants
completing the task in 10 minutes had 5 minutes remaining (i.e., 300 seconds) and
a participant completing the task in 14 minutes had 1 minute remaining (i.e., 60
seconds). Participants who failed to complete the task received an efficiency score
of 0. See Table 1 for means and standard deviation of efficiency and accuracy by
study condition.
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Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Outcome Variables by Study Condition

Goal

Task

Both

Control

Total

N

39

44

41

42

166

Proportion of time on task

0.84 (.36)

0.95 (.20)

0.85 (.35)

0.90 (.29)

0.89 (.30)

Accuracy

11.26 (6.00)

12.82 (9.19)

12.46 (9.79)

10.50 (8.92)

11.78 (8.78)

Efficiency

3.41 (13.88)

17.10 (50.62)

12.15 (42.98)

20.57 (59.66)

13.54 (45.67)

Note: Values in the cells are presented as means followed by the standard deviation in parentheses.
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PART III
Results & Analyses
Before hypothesis testing, data were screened for violations of statistical
assumptions. The data preparation and screening process is detailed below.
Data Preparation and Screening
In total, data were collected from 235 participants; however, only 166
participants were included in the analyses. Twelve participants failed the
manipulation check and were removed from the final sample and 2 participants
were removed due to missing records on the experimental log (e.g., time on task
vs. email, engagement). Data from 55 participants were excluded from the
analyses as a result of a failure to match the unique password supplied for both
the pre-lab and lab portions of the study. Specifically, some participants either
provided the same password as another participant (e.g., non-unique password
such as ‘password123’) making it difficult to identify to whom data belonged, or
they did not provide a password that could be found in the pre-lab dataset. This
resulted in missing data on all covariates. A series of independent samples t-tests
was performed comparing the mean scores of the included and excluded
participants on the key study variables. There were no significant differences for
the scores on working memory (t [219] = .25, ns), accuracy (t [219] = .73, ns), nor
efficiency (t [219] = .17, ns) between participants included and excluded from the
analyses. However, there was a significant difference for proportion of time on
task between the included (M = .88, SD = .30) and excluded participants (M = .99,
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SD =0.02; t [219] = -2.64, p < .01). Participants excluded from the sample spent a
greater proportion of time on the task than those included in the sample. However,
the decision to exclude participants without scores on all covariates was
maintained. This decision was made because the covariates were significant
predictors in the regression models and because the sample size without the 55
cases with missing data was adequate for detecting a medium-sized effect.
A post-hoc power analysis was conducted using G*Power version 3.0.10.
Power was calculated for the regression analysis with the largest number of
predictors (14, including control variables); the results indicated that there was
sufficient power (i.e., .88) to detect a medium-sized effect (.15) at α =.05 with the
sample size of 1611 (Cohen, 1992; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).
Normality assumptions. To examine normality assumptions, preliminary
analyses were conducted to assess skewness and kurtosis. All main study
variables, including working memory capacity, proportion of time on task, task
efficiency, and accuracy, were examined. To assess normality, skewness and
kurtosis values were divided by their standard errors. Resulting values above 1.96
indicated the presence of skewness and kurtosis within the data (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2007). Using this metric, it was discovered that both outcomes, the
mediating, and moderating variables were non-normal in distribution. As a result,
these variables were transformed prior to hypotheses testing.
Specifically, the proposed mediating variable, proportion of time on task,
was significantly left-skewed and was raised to the power of 4 to reduce skewness

1

Some cases were deleted during the analyses due to missing data on one covariate (e.g., GMA,
conscientiousness).
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and kurtosis. The transformation reduced the skewness of the distribution but the
variable remained non-normally distributed, most likely because there was a
highly restricted range. Working memory was also transformed by raising the
variable to the power of 2; this transformation successfully normalized the
distribution of working memory. Additionally, both dependent variables
(accuracy and efficiency) were also transformed. Accuracy was slightly rightskewed and was converted using a square root transformation. This
transformation successfully normalized the distribution of accuracy. Efficiency
was re-expressed using the reciprocal root of the original values. Before
conducting this transformation, a value of 1 was added to all variables as
participants who did not complete the task had an efficiency score of 0. This
transformation reduced the skewness and kurtosis of this variable but did not
result in a normal distribution as efficiency was also highly restricted in range. All
regression analyses were conducted using the transformed values. Table 2 reports
the mean and standard deviations for all study variables including transformed
variables.
Regression assumptions. To ensure that assumptions of regression were
met, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and influential observations were
examined using the transformed variables. To assess multicollinearity two
preliminary linear regression models were run predicting each outcome variable
(i.e., accuracy and efficiency). Tolerance and Index of Variance Inflation (VIF)
values were examined to assess the presence of multicollinearity. However, all
values were within normal range (O’Brien, 2007).
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To assess heteroscedasticity, residuals were plotted against predicted
scores and plots were visually inspected to confirm homogeneity of variance. The
regression model including task accuracy as the outcome demonstrated no cause
for concern regarding homogeneity of variance. However, the linear model
predicting task efficiency suggested a violation of the assumption of
homoscedasticity. As a result, a formal test of heteroscedasticity was conducted.
The Breusch-Pagan test, which examines whether variance in the residuals is
predicted by the independent variables, was conducted (Breusch & Pagan, 1979;
Hayes & Cai, 2007). This test confirmed homogeneity of variance.
Finally, the Cook’s distance was used to identify influential observations.
All values were examined to identify any Cook’s distance scores greater that 4/(nk-1) (Chatterjee & Hadi, 1988). To account for any differences in the analyses
resulting from these influential observations, analyses were conducted both with
and without these observations. Where influential observations were identified,
this will be reported for the relevant analysis in the result section.
Analytical Approach
Hypotheses for this study were tested using regression analyses. When
applicable, moderated-mediation analysis was used to test specific hypotheses
(Hayes, 2013a). In the case of this study, time spent on the primary task was
expected to mediate or explain the effect of cue type on performance. Working
memory was also expected to moderate the direct effect of cue type on
performance as well as the effect of cue type on time spent on task. This effect
was tested using the PROCESS macro developed by Hayes’ (2013b), specifically
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using Hayes’s (2013b) Model 8. The approach uses an ordinary least square path
analytic approach with bootstrap and Monte Carlo confidence intervals. This
approach is considered superior to the combination of Baron and Kenny’s (1986)
step approach to mediational analyses with the Sobel test (Hayes, 2015; Preacher
& Hayes, 2004). Using this PROCESS model, mediation is determined and
communicated using the indirect effects rather than the a and b coefficients as is
traditionally done with the Baron and Kenny method (Preacher & Kelley, 2011).
While moderated mediation analysis is widely used in the social sciences,
it is typically used to examine continuous independent variables. In this study, the
independent variable (cue type) was categorical and had 4 levels (task cue, goal
cue, both task and goal cues, and no cue); the additional predictors were
continuous. Recently, a treatment for categorical independent variables has been
proposed using the PROCESS macro for testing mediation analyses (Hayes &
Preacher, 2014). This approach is thought to be superior to other approaches
which require the researcher to dichotomize independent variables with more than
two levels, collapse groups, or use continuous manipulations checks as substitutes
for independent variables (e.g., Forgas, 2011; Ronay, Greenaway, Anicich, &
Galinsky, 2012).
This approach involves dummy coding the categorical independent
variables and repeating the analyses for each dummy coded variable; in the case
of this study, 2 analyses were conducted. When the independent variable is
categorical, parameter estimates are needed to represent the indirect effect at each
level of the independent variable. These estimates represent relative effects
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(Hayes & Preacher, 2014). In other words, the effects reported for each level of
the categorical independent variable should be interpreted as relative to referent
dummy-coded group.
To test the overall model in this study, the four cue conditions were
represented using 3 dummy-coded variables. The task cue group was used as the
referent group and participants in this condition were coded as 0 for all three
dummy variables. D1 represented the goal cue/not goal cue distinction. D2
represented the goal and task cue/not goal and task cue distinction, and D3
represented the control/not control distinction. The PROCESS macro was
executed 2 times for each outcome variable to determine the indirect effects and
conditional effects of working memory for each level of cue type. With each test,
the dummy code with the distinction of interest (e.g., goal cue versus non goal cue
distinction) was entered as the predictor; however, so that the comparison was the
referent group (i.e., task cue), the other dummy codes were included as covariates
in the same model. For example, when testing the effect of goal cue as the
independent variable, the dummy codes for both task and goal cues and the
control group were entered in the model as covariates. In the tables displaying
results, the cue types are indicated as D1, D2, and D3, as described above.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations of Study Variables

Mean

SD

1

1. Conscientiousness

3.69

0.46

(.86)

2. GO Learning

5.09

1.10

.23**

(.77)

3. GO Prove

4.20

1.33

.18*

.07

(.76)

4. GO Avoid

4.71

1.09

-.07

-.39**

.31**

(.76)

5. Task Efficacy

58.76

25.22

.10

.16*

.09

-.14

(.98)

6. GMA

23.55

3.28

-.07

.09

-.04

.01

.18*

--

2.82

1.60

.05

.11

-.06

-.11

.25**

.05

--

8. Working Memory Score

34.97

9.17

-.15

.02

.06

.03

.21**

.41**

.11

--

9. Working Memory ScoreT

1306

591

-.14

.05

.05

.01

.23**

.42**

.13

.98**

--

10. Pretest

8.04

2.28

-.07

.12

-.12

-.21**

.39**

.37**

.21**

.28**

.27**

--

11. Task Time

891

182

.10

.13

-.08

-.05

.02

-.10

-.04

-.16*

-.13

-.10

12. E-mail Time

9.44

18.89

-.01

.03

.17*

-.07

.07

-.04

.09

-.09

-.10

-.04

13. Task Time(Proportion)

0.88

0.30

-.01

.00

-.05

-.01

-.10

.04

-.03

.01

.03

.08

14. Task Time(Proportion)T

0.96

0.08

.01

-.03

-.17*

.06

-.07

.03

-.09

.09

.10

.04

15. Task Efficiency

13.54

45.67

.09

-.01

.07

.07

.21**

.21**

.20*

.07

.06

.13

16. Task EfficiencyT

2.12

3.18

.12

-.01

.09

.09

.20**

.20**

.20*

.06

.05

.13

11.78

8.78

.21**

.20*

-.13

-.26**

.22**

.34**

.13

.10

.13

.28**

3.32

1.32

.22**

.19*

-.12

-.25**

.24**

.33**

.15

.07

.10

.29**

7. Excel Frequency

17. Task Accuracy
T

18. Task Accuracy

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). GO = goal orientation. Propor = proportion. T = transformed variable.
Time is reported in seconds. N = 166 for all study variables with the exception of GMA (N = 163), conscientiousness, learning, prove and avoid goal orientation, task efficacy and
Excel frequency (N = 165).
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations of Study Variables, continued

11
11. Task Time

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

--

12. E-mail Time

-0.14

--

0.1

-0.15

--

.16*

-.99**

.16*

--

15. Task Efficiency

-.26**

0.01

-.18*

-0.01

--

16. Task EfficiencyT

-.26**

0.02

-0.15

-0.03

.96**

--

0.04

0.06

-0.1

-0.05

0.12

0.07

--

0.06

0.05

-0.08

-0.04

0.13

0.1

.98**

13. Task Time(Proportion)
14. Task Time(Proportion)

17. Task Accuracy
T

18. Task Accuracy

T

--

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). GO = goal orientation. Propor = proportion.
T
= transformed variable. Time is reported in seconds. N = 166 for all study variables with the exception of GMA (N = 163), conscientiousness, learning, prove and avoid goal
orientation, task efficacy and Excel frequency (N = 165).
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Hypothesis I
The first hypothesis predicted that there would be a positive relationship
between working memory and time spent on task such that participants with
higher working memory capacity would spend more time on the task (i.e., be less
distracted by the e-mails). To test this hypothesis, a hierarchical regression model
was run with transformed proportion of time on task as the dependent variable, a
control variable related to transformed proportion of time on task (i.e., GO prove)
entered as a first step, and transformed working memory capacity entered in the
second step. The overall model was significant (F [2, 162] = 3.34, p = .04), but
results indicated no support for Hypothesis I. Specifically, the relationship
between transformed working memory capacity and transformed proportion of
time on task was nonsignificant (β = .10, p = .19, 95% CI [.00, .00]).
An examination of regression assumptions indicated the presence of 10
influential observations for this analysis. The analysis was conducted a second
time without the influential observations. While the magnitude of the effect of the
control variable (i.e., GO prove) was reduced in the analysis without influential
observations, the effect of working memory did not change substantially. Table 3
presents the results of the regression analyses with and without influential
observations.
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Table 3
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Working Memory as a Predictor of Proportion of Time on Task
(Hypothesis I)

Step
Step 1: Control Variable
Intercept
GO Prove
Step 2: Predictor
Intercept
Working MemoryT

Step
Step 1: Control Variable
Intercept
GO Prove
Step 2: Predictor
Intercept
Working MemoryT
**

b
1.00
-.01

b
1.01
-.01

With Influential Observations
Step 1
SE
β
t
R2
F
.03 4.95*
.02
50.92*
.00 -.17 -2.23*

Without Influential Observations
Step 1
SE
β
t
R2
F
.03
5.08*
.02
47.89*
.01 -.18 -2.25*

b

SE

-.10

.00

.99
1.32

.02
.00

b

SE

-.01

.01

.99
1.38

.02
.00

Step 2
β
t

-.18

-2.30*

.10

42.78*
1.31

Step 2
β
t

-.18

R2
.04

R2
.04

-2.32*

40.32*
.10 1.29

Significant at the 0.01 level. * Significant at the 0.05 level. T = transformed variable. N = 165 with influential observations. N = 155 without
influential observations.

F
3.34*

F
3.38*
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Hypothesis II
Hypothesis II predicted a positive relationship between time spent on task
and performance in terms of (a) accuracy and (b) efficiency. That is, participants
who spent more time on the task, relative to time on e-mails, would more
accurately and quickly complete the task. Hypothesis IIa was tested with a
hierarchical regression model in which transformed accuracy was the dependent
variable. Step 1 included covariates related to the outcome (i.e.,
conscientiousness, learning and avoid goal orientation, task efficacy, and GMA),
and step 2 included transformed proportion of time on task. The overall model
was significant, (F [6, 154] = 7.53, p < .0.01), but results indicated no support for
Hypothesis IIa. Specifically, the relationship between transformed proportion of
time on task and transformed accuracy was nonsignificant (β = -.04, p = .61, 95%
CI [-3.00, 1.74]).
An examination of regression assumptions indicated the presence of 6
influential observations for this analysis. The analysis was conducted a second
time without the influential observations. The effect of proportion of time on task
did not change substantially. Table 4 presents the results of the regression
analyses with and without influential observations.
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Table 4
Results of the Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Proportion of Time on Task as a Predictor of Task Accuracy
(Hypothesis IIa)
With Influential Observations
Step
Step 1: Control Variables
Intercept
Conscientiousness
GO Avoid
GO Learn
Task Efficacy
GMA
Step 2: Predictor
Intercept
Proportion of Time on TaskT

b

SE

-.99
.57
-.26
-.00
.01
.13

1.91
.21
.09
.09
.00
.03

Step
b
Step 1: Control Variables
Intercept
-1.64
Conscientiousness
.60
GO Avoid
-.24
GO Learn
-.00
Task Efficacy
.01
GMA
.13
Step 2: Predictor
Intercept
Proportion of Time on TaskT
**

β

Step 1
t

.20
-.21
-.00
.12
.32

-.83
2.77**
-2.75**
-.02
1.62
4.45**

Step 2
R2
.23

F
9.02**

Without Influential Observations
Step 1
SE
β
t
R2
F
.22 8.19**
1.17
-1.40
.21 .22
2.81**
.10 -.19 -2.40**
.10 -.00
-.04
.00 .13
1.66
.03 .32
4.30**

b

SE

β

t

.57
-.25
-.00
.01
.13

.21
.09
.10
.00
.03

.20
-.21
-.00
.12
.33

2.78**
-2.72**
-.03
1.58
4.46**

-.41
-.62

1.63
1.20

-.04

-.25
-.52

b

SE

Step 2
β
t

.62
-.23
-.01
.01
.14

.22
.10
.10
.00
.03

.22
-.19
-.01
.12
.33

2.86**
-2.39*
-.06
1.63
4.35**

-.91
-1.34

1.65
1.32

-.07

-.55
-1.01

R2
.23

F
7.53**

R2
.23

F
7.00**

Significant at the 0.01 level. * Significant at the 0.05 level. T = transformed variable. N = 161 with influential observations. N = 155 without
influential observations.
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Hypothesis IIb predicted a positive relationship between proportion of
time on task and task efficiency. Hypothesis IIb was tested using a linear
regression model in which transformed task efficiency was the dependent
variable. Step 1 included covariates related to the outcome (i.e., task efficacy,
GMA, and frequency of Microsoft Excel use) and step 2 included transformed
proportion of time on task. Results are reported in Table 5. The overall model was
significant, (F [3, 157] = 4.14, p < .0.01), but results indicated no support for
Hypothesis IIb. Specifically, the relationship between transformed proportion of
time on task and transformed efficiency was not significant (β = -.01, p = .90,
95% CI [-6.67. 5.87]). There were no influential observations detected in this
analysis.
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Table 5
Results of the Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Proportion of Time on Task as a Predictor of Task Efficiency
(Hypothesis IIb)

Step
b
SE
Step 1: Control Variables
Intercept
-3.84 1.82
Task Efficacy
.02 .01
GMA
.17 .08
Excel Frequency
.32 .16
Step 2: Predictor
Intercept
Proportion of Time on TaskT
**

β

Step 1
t

Step 2
2

R
F
.10 5.55**

-2.12*
.14
1.73
.18 2.27*
.16 2.01*

Significant at the 0.01 level. * Significant at the 0.05 level. T = transformed variable. N = 161.

b

SE

β

t

.02
.17
.32

.01
.08
.16

.14
.18
.16

1.72
2.27*
1.99*

-3.47
-.39

3.54
3.18

-.01

-.98
-.12

R2
.10

F
4.14**
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Hypotheses III, IV, and V
Hypothesis III predicted that the relationship between cue type and
performance (a) accuracy and (b) efficiency would be mediated by proportion of
time on task. Hypothesis IV predicted that working memory would moderate the
effect of cue type on time spent on the primary task. Specifically, as working
memory increases, individuals who are exposed to the goal-focused cue or the
goal- and task-focused cues were expected to spend more time on the task than
individuals exposed to the task-focused cue. As working memory decreases,
individuals exposed to task cues were expected to spend more time on the task
than individuals exposed to the goal- and task-focused cues.
Finally, Hypothesis V predicted that working memory would moderate the
effect of cue type on performance in terms of (a) accuracy and (b) efficiency (i.e.,
direct/path c’ effect). Explicitly, as working memory increases, individuals
exposed to the goal-focused cue or the goal- and task-focused cues were expected
to demonstrate higher performance in terms of (a) accuracy and (b) efficiency on
the task than individuals exposed to the task-focused cue. As working memory
decreases, individuals exposed to task cues were expected to demonstrate higher
performance in terms of (a) accuracy and (b) efficiency on the task than
individuals exposed to the goal- and task-focused cues. Hypotheses III-V were
examined using Model 8 of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013a; 2013b). First the
overall model results are presented followed by the specific coefficients that
examine each hypothesis. Results for task accuracy are discussed first, followed
by the results for task efficiency.
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Overall model results for task accuracy. The overall results of the
moderated-mediated analyses, with and without 4 influential observations, for
task accuracy are summarized in Table 62. Covariates observed as having an
effect on transformed accuracy (i.e., conscientiousness, learning and avoid goal
orientation, general mental ability, pre-test, and task efficacy) were included in
the model. For the analysis predicting transformed task accuracy, the overall
model statistics for the path predicting transformed proportion of time on task
were nonsignificant (F [13, 147] = .42, ns). However, the overall model
predicting transformed accuracy was significant [F [14, 146] = 3.50, p < .01]

2

Indirect and conditional direct effects for the model tested without influential observations are
not reported as these effects did not change substantially.
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Table 6
Results of the Moderated-Mediated Analyses with Accuracy as the Outcome:
Model Summary and Coefficients
With Influential Observations
Outcome: Proportion of
Time on TaskT
Control Variables
Intercept
Conscientiousness
GO Learn
GO Avoid
GMA
Pre-test
Task Efficacy
Predictors
D1
D2
D3
WMT
D1 * WMT
D2 * WMT
D3 * WMT
Outcome: AccuracyT
Control Variables
Intercept
Conscientiousness
GO Learn
GO Avoid
GMA
Pre-test
Task Efficacy
Predictors
D1
D2
D3
WMT
D1 * WMT
D2 * WMT
D3 * WMT
Proportion of Time on TaskT
**

b
.93*
.01
-.00
.00
-.00
.00
-.00

.09
.01
.01
.01
.00
.00
.00

.00
-.01
-.01
.00
.00
.00
.00

.02
.02
.02
.00
.00
.00
.00

b

R2
.04

SE

SE

-.75
.57*
-.01
-.23*
.13
.07
.00

1.74
.22
.01
.01
.03
.05
.00

.07
-.19
-.22
-.00
.00
.00
.00
-.81

.28
.28
.27
.00
.00
.00
.00
1.23

R2
.25

F
.42

F
3.50**

Significant at the 0.01 level. * Significant at the 0.05 level. T = transformed variable.
WM = working memory. N = 161. Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task cue was
coded as the referent group. D1 = goal cue; D2 = both task and goal cues; D3 = control.
b = unstandardized regression coefficient. Boot strap sample size = 10,000.
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Table 6
Results of the Moderated-Mediated Analyses with Accuracy as the Outcome:
Model Summary and Coefficients, continued
Without Influential Observations
Outcome: Proportion of
Time on TaskT
Control Variables
Intercept
Conscientiousness
GO Learn
GO Avoid
GMA
Pre-test
Task Efficacy
Predictors
D1
D2
D3
WMT
D1 * WMT
D2 * WMT
D3 * WMT
Outcome: AccuracyT
Control Variables
Intercept
Conscientiousness
GO Learn
GO Avoid
GMA
Pre-test
Task Efficacy
Predictors
D1
D2
D3
WMT
D1 * WMT
D2 * WMT
D3 * WMT
Proportion of Time on TaskT
**

b
.95*
.01
-.00
.00
-.00
.00
-.00

.09
.01
.01
.01
.00
.00
.00

.00
-.01
-.01
.00
.00
.00
.00

.02
.02
.02
.00
.00
.00
.00

b

R2
.04

SE

SE

-.67
.56*
-.05
-.22*
.13
.05
.01

1.74
.221
.10
.10
.03
.05
.00

.13
-.19
-.41
-.00
.00
.00
-.00
-.61

.27
.27
.27
.00
.00
.00
.00
1.20

R2
.26

F
.41

F
3.61**

Significant at the 0.01 level. * Significant at the 0.05 level. T = transformed variable.
WM = working memory. N = 157. Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task cue was
coded as the referent group. D1 = goal cue; D2 = both task and goal cues; D3 = control. b =
unstandardized regression coefficient. Boot strap sample size = 10,000.
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Hypothesis IIIa predicted that the relationship between cue type and
accuracy would be mediated by proportion of time on task. The first analyses
examined the indirect effect of cue on transformed accuracy through proportion of
time spent on task. Analyses controlled for conscientiousness, learning and avoid
goal orientation, general mental ability, pre-test, and task efficacy. Table 7
displays the unstandardized regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), and
bootstrapped results for the indirect effects. There was no significant difference
between the task cue and the goal (b = -.00) nor between task cue and both task
and goal cues (b = .00) conditions in predicting transformed accuracy through
transformed time spent on task. Bootstrap results with a bootstrapped 95% CI
around the indirect effect included zero (goal cue [.00, .00], both task and goal
cues [-.00, .00]). Therefore, Hypothesis IIIa was not supported.

Table 7
Relative Indirect Effect of Task Cue Type on Task AccuracyT through Proportion
of TimeT on Task

Effect
SE (Boot)
BootLLCI
BootULCI

Goal Cue

Both Task and Goal Cues

.0000
.0000
.0000
.0001

.0000
.0001
-.0002
.0000

Note: Cue type was dummy coded. N = 161. Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task
cue was coded as the referent group. Effects are relative to the task cue. Bootstrap sample size
= 10,000. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. Effects are unstandardized
coefficient estimates. T = transformed variable.
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Hypothesis IV predicted that working memory would moderate the effect
of cue type on time spent on the primary task. Specifically, as working memory
increases, individuals who are exposed to the goal-focused cue or the goal- and
task-focused cues were expected to spend more time on the task than individuals
exposed to the task-focused cue. As working memory decreases, individuals
exposed to task cues were expected to spend more time on the task than
individuals exposed to the goal- and task-focused cues. Results from the overall
moderated-mediated model predicting transformed task accuracy3 (Table 6)
indicated no significant moderated effect of transformed working memory on the
cue type and transformed proportion of time on task relationship for neither goal
cue as compared to the task cue (b = .00) nor both task and goal cues as compared
to the task cue (b = .00) in the model predicting transformed task accuracy.
Results for the analyses testing whether transformed working memory
moderated the relationship between cue type and transformed accuracy
(Hypothesis Va) are presented in Table 8. Results indicated that the conditional
direct effects of working memory were nonsignificant at 1 standard deviation
below the mean on transformed working memory (goal cue, b = .00, ns; both task
and goal cues, b = -.47, ns), at the mean (goal cue, b = .08; both task and goal
cues, b = -.19, ns), and 1 standard deviation above the mean (goal cue, b = .15, ns;
both task and goal cues, b = .09, ns). These results indicate that there were no
differences between the conditional direct effects for participants in the task cue
condition compared to those in the goal and both task and goal cues conditions at

3

These results are independent of type of performance and are therefore identical in both
models.
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different levels of working memory. Therefore, Hypothesis Va was not supported.
Given no significant effects observed for the independent, proposed moderating,
or proposed mediating variables in this analysis, this model was not explored
further.
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Table 8
Conditional Direct Effect of Working MemoryT on the Effect of Cue Type on Task AccuracyT

Both Task and Goal Cues

Goal Cue
WM Level

Conditional
Direct Effects

SE

t

LLCI

ULCI

Conditional
Direct Effects

SE

t

LLCI

ULCI

-1SD

.00

.37

.01

-.74

.74

-.47

.41

- 1.15

-1.29

.34

Mean

.08

.28

.78

-.47

.62

-.19

.28

-.69

-.74

.36

+1SD

.15

.39

.39

-.62

.92

.09

.37

.24

-.65

.83

Note: Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task cue was coded as the referent group. Levels for working memory are the mean and
plus/minus one SD from mean. N = 161. Direct effects are unstandardized coefficient estimates. Bootstrap sample size = 10,000.
CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. T = transformed variable.
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Overall model results for task efficiency. The overall results of the
moderated-mediated analyses, with and without 5 influential observations, for
task efficiency are summarized in Table 94. Covariates observed as having an
effect on transformed efficiency were included in the model (i.e., frequency of
Microsoft Excel use, general mental ability, and task efficacy). Overall model
statistics for the path predicting transformed proportion of time on task was
nonsignificant (F [10, 150] = .58, ns). However, the overall model for the path
predicting transformed efficiency were significant (F [11, 149]
= 1.99, p < .05).
Additionally, one noteworthy difference was observed between the
analyses conducted with and without influential observations. Specifically, a
significant effect of both task and goal cues was observed for the effect on
transformed task efficiency (b = -.77, p = .02, 95% CI [-1.40, -.13] indicating a
significant difference between both task and goal cues and the task cue
conditions, excluding influential observations. Follow-up analyses will be
discussed in the upcoming section on trimmed model testing.

4

Indirect and conditional direct effects for the model tested without influential observations are
not reported as these effects did not change substantially.
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Table 9
Results of the Moderated-Mediated Analyses with Efficiency as the Outcome:
Model Summary and Coefficients
With Influential Observations
Outcome: Proportion of Time
b
SE
R2
F
on TaskT
.04
.58
Control Variables
*
Intercept
.98
.05
Excel Frequency
-.00
.00
GMA
.00
.00
Task Efficacy
-.00
.00
Predictors
D1
-.00
.02
D2
-.01
.02
D3
-.01
.02
WMT
.00
.00
T
D1 * WM
.00
.00
D2 * WMT
.00
.00
D3 * WMT
.00
.00
T
R2
F
b
SE
Outcome: Efficiency
.13
1.99*
Control Variables
Intercept
-4.49
3.81
Excel Frequency
.33*
.16
GMA
.20*
.09
Task Efficacy
.02
.00
Predictors
D1
-.85
.71
D2
-.78
.72
D3
.09
.70
WMT
-.00
.00
T
D1 * WM
-.00
.00
T
D2 * WM
.00
.00
D3 * WMT
.00
.00
T
Proportion of Time on Task
.09
3.23
**

Significant at the 0.01 level. * Significant at the 0.05 level. T = transformed variable.
WM = working memory. N = 161. Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task cue was
coded as the referent group. D1 = goal cue; D2 = both task and goal cues; D3 = control. b =
unstandardized regression coefficient. Boot strap sample size = 10,000.
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Table 9
Results of the Moderated-Mediated Analyses with Efficiency as the Outcome:
Model Summary and Coefficients, continued
Without Influential Observations
Outcome: Proportion of
b
SE
R2
F
Time on TaskT
.04
.54
Control Variables
Intercept
.98*
.05
Excel Frequency
-.00
.00
GMA
.00
.00
Task Efficacy
-.00
.00
Predictors
D1
-.00
.02
D2
-.01
.02
D3
-.01
.02
WMT
.00
.00
D1 * WMT
.00
.00
T
D2 * WM
.00
.00
D3 * WMT
.00
.00
T
R2
F
b
SE
Outcome: Efficiency
.08
1.00
Control Variables
Intercept
.11
1.79
Excel Frequency
.08
.07
GMA
.04
.04
Task Efficacy
-.00
.00
Predictors
D1
-.54
.32
D2
-.77*
.32
D3
.60
.33
WMT
-.00
.00
T
D1 * WM
-.00
.00
D2 * WMT
-.00
.00
T
D3 * WM
.00
.00
T
Proportion of Time on Task
.52
1.53
**

Significant at the 0.01 level. * Significant at the 0.05 level. T = transformed variable.
WM = working memory. N = 156. Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task cue was
coded as the referent group. D1 = goal cue; D2 = both task and goal cues; D3 = control.
b = unstandardized regression coefficient. Boot strap sample size = 10,000.
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The second set of analyses examined the indirect effect of cue on
transformed efficiency through time spent on task. Analyses controlled for
frequency of Microsoft Excel use, general mental ability, and task efficacy as
these were observed as related to transformed efficiency. Table 10 displays the
unstandardized regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), and bootstrapped
results for the indirect effects. There was no significant difference between the
task cue and the goal (b = .00) nor between task cue and both task and goal cues
(b = .00) in predicting transformed efficiency through transformed time spent on
task. Bootstrap results with a bootstrapped 95% CI around the indirect effect
included zero (goal cue [-.00, .00]; both task and goal cues [-.00, .00). Therefore,
Hypothesis IIIb was not supported.

Table 10
Relative Indirect Effect of Task Cue Type on Task EfficiencyT through Proportion
of TimeT on Task

Effect
SE (Boot)
BootLLCI
BootULCI

Goal
.0000
.0001
-.0002
.0002

Both Task and Goal Cues
.0000
.0001
-.0003
.0003

Note: Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task cue was coded as the referent group.
Effects are relative to the task cue. N = 161. Bootstrap sample size = 10,000. CI = confidence
interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. Effects are unstandardized coefficient estimates.
T
= transformed variable.
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Results for the analyses testing whether transformed working memory
moderated the relationship between cue type and transformed efficiency are
presented in Table 11. Results indicated that the conditional direct effects of
working memory were nonsignificant at 1 standard deviation below the mean on
transformed working memory (goal cue, b = -.40, ns; both task and goal cues, b =
-1.03, ns), at the mean (goal cue, b = -.85; both task and goal cues, b = -.79, ns),
and 1 standard deviation above the mean (goal cue, b = -1.31, ns; both task and
goal cues, b = -.54, ns). These results indicate that there were no differences
between the conditional direct effects for participants in the task cue condition
compared to those in the goal and both task and goal cues conditions at different
levels of working memory. Therefore, Hypothesis Vb was not supported.
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Table 11
Conditional Direct Effect of Working MemoryT on the Effect of Cue Type on Task EfficiencyT

Goal Cue

Both Task and Goal Cues

WM
Level

Conditional
Direct Effects

SE

t

LLCI

ULCI

Conditional
Direct Effects

SE

t

LLCI

ULCI

-1SD

-.40

.98

-.41

-2.33

1.53

-1.03

1.07

-.96

-3.15

1.09

Mean

-.85

.71

-1.19

-2.26

.55

-.79

.72

-1.09

-2.20

.63

+1SD
-1.31
1.00
-1.30
-3.29
.68
-.54
.97
-.55
-2.47
1.39
Note: T = transformed variable. Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task cue was coded as the referent group. N = 161. Levels for
working memory are the mean and plus/minus one SD from mean. Direct effects are unstandardized coefficient estimates. Bootstrap sample
size = 10,000. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. T = transformed variable.
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Trimmed model. A significant effect was observed for cue type on task
efficiency when excluding influential observations. Given that the effects of the
covariates (i.e., GMA, task efficacy, Excel frequency), the moderator
(transformed working memory), and the mediator (transformed proportion of time
on task) included in the model were not significant, a final trimmed model was
tested to provide the most accurate test and estimates of the significant
relationships. This model was tested using regression analysis in which
transformed task efficiency was the dependent variable. Results are reported in
Table 12. Results indicated that the overall model was significant, (F [3, 155]
= 2.68, p < .0.05). The goal cue condition (b = -.73, p < .05, 95% CI [-1.41, -.08])
and both task and goal cues condition (b = -.87, p < .05, 95% CI [-1.56, -.22])
were significantly lower than the task cue condition on transformed efficiency.
Given that higher efficiency scores indicate greater efficiency, the results suggest
that in comparison to participants in the task cue condition, participants in the
goal and both task and goal cues conditions were less efficient on the task.
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Table 12
Results of the Regression Analysis of Cue Type as a Predictor of Task EfficiencyT

b
Intercept
D1
D2
D3
**

1.97
-.73
-.87
-.63

SE
.23
.33
.33
.33

β

-.21
-.25
-.18

t

R2
.05

F
2.68*

8.54*
-1.92*
-.2.17*
-2.62

Significant at the 0.01 level. * Significant at the 0.05 level. T = transformed variable. N = 156.
Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task cue was coded as the referent group. D1 = goal
cue; D2 = both task and goal cues; D3 = control. This analysis excludes influential observations.
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PART IV
Discussion
Using resource theories and naturalistic decision making theory, this study
sought to identify appropriate allocation strategies for individuals based on
working memory capacity. The extant literature consistently concludes that
individuals with low working memory capacity are often more likely to be
distracted by task-irrelevant information (Lavie et al., 2004; Redick & Engle,
2006) and less likely to show high performance in situations involving multiple
stimuli (Buhner, et al., 2006). Essentially, individuals with low working memory
capacity are more sensitive to task- or stimuli-driven information, while those
with high working memory capacity better attend to goal-derived information.
Given this tendency, this study proposed that cueing individuals’ attention
allocation at the level to which they are more sensitive would result in better
allocation decisions (i.e., more time on task) and higher performance.
In the following sections, I will discuss four main observations from the
current study associated with the effects observed. First, I discuss the allocation
pattern that emerged during the performance of the task. I anticipated that the
allocation of attention to the task would be determined by working memory
capacity. However, this was not observed in the study. Possible explanations for
the actual allocation patterns observed are presented. Second, I discuss the
relationship observed between the allocation of attention and task performance.
This study predicted that performance on the task would benefit from an increase
in the attention allocated to the task. However, this effect was not observed.
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Third, it was expected that time spent on the task would explain the effect of cue
type on performance. Possible reasons for this nonsignificant finding are
presented. Finally, I discuss the findings observed regarding the effect of cue type
on efficiency—the observation of allocation cueing at the task-level being
associated with greater efficiency, in comparison to goal and both goal and task
cueing.
Working Memory
Working memory is associated with the ability to focus on prioritized
activities as well as goal-relevant information (Lavie et al., 2004; Redick &
Engle, 2006). In the present study, individuals were presented with a task,
alongside distracting stimuli, and informed that their priority was performance on
the task. I expected that individuals with high working memory capacity would
demonstrate better attention allocation patterns by focusing more time on the task
and ignoring the non-task-related stimuli presented (HI). However, working
memory capacity was not associated with allocation pattern in the context
presented. In this study, the majority of participants spent the entire time on the
primary task and did not open the distractor e-mails received.
One possible explanation concerns the element of time pressure induced in
the study design. During this study, participants were given 15 minutes to
complete a task that typically requires 25 minutes for completion (Mann et al.,
2013; Mitchell, et al., 2014). This was done to make the task more challenging
and thereby encourage a need to focus on the task in order to be successful.
However, it is possible that this element of pressure dissuaded participants from
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engaging with the e-mails. For one, inducing a time pressure on individuals may
place pressure on available resources (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007), resources that
are already limited (Kahneman, 1973). As a result, to meet the demands of the
situation, participants may have actively managed their time and attention in an
effort to balance their available resources with that needed to complete the task.
From a resource allocation perspective, this effect may further be explained by the
ability-motivation interaction.
The ability-motivation interaction proposes that the allocation of attention
is a function of both an individual’s cognitive ability and motivational processes
(Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). In the present study, working memory, a
cognitively-based ability, failed to demonstrate any effect on the allocation of
attentional resources. Theoretically, allocation decisions may have instead been
directed by the motivational states of participants—influencing their choice to
engage in the task as well as guiding their self-regulatory processes (e.g., on-task
vs. off-task activities) throughout the task (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). The
situational strength hypothesis—the idea that implicit or explicit situational cues
may restrict the influence of individual differences (Mischel, 1999)—may further
support this explanation. Explicitly, the addition of a time pressure, or the
allocation cues, may have strengthened the situation; thereby, suppressing any
influence of working memory by motivating participants to primarily focus on the
task.

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

88

Attention
The primary allocation of attention to the task was expected to have a
functional role. Namely, by allocating attention to the task activities and away
from the off-task activities, performance was expected to increase (HII;
Minbashian & Luppino, 2014). The absence of this effect may be related to the
nature of the experimental task. From a resource theory perspective, a task is said
to be resource-limited when variations in the amount of attention allocated to that
task influences performance. Alternatively, a task is data-limited when the amount
of attention allocated to the task has no effect on task performance (Norman &
Bobrow, 1975). It is possible that the task used was data-limited for the sample.
For example, average frequency of Excel use was 2.82, an average that
corresponds with a range between a few times per month and once per month.
Therefore, participants may have required additional experience and training
using Excel for their effort or attention on the task to result in a performance payoff. Additionally, proportion of time on task could have failed to have an effect as
a result of statistical limitations.
The variable representing attention—proportion of time on-task—was
nonnormally distributed. Given that the majority of participants committed all
their task-time to the task, this variable demonstrated a “ceiling effect” (Luther,
2000), whereby the majority of participants clustered around the high end of the
distribution (i.e., entire proportion of time on task; value of 1). This distribution
was both skewed and restricted in range. Consequently, the absence of an effect
of proportion of time on-task on performance (HIIa and HIIb) as well as the
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absence of a mediating effect of this variable on the cue type-performance
relationship (HIIIa and HIIIb) could have been a result of violating the normality
assumption or the restriction in range.
Allocation Cues
The most unique contribution of this study was the introduction of
allocation cues and the proposed contingent effect of working memory on both
allocation decisions and performance. Specifically, I predicted that individuals
with high working memory capacity would make better allocation decisions (i.e.,
spend more time on the task) and demonstrate higher performance when cued to
allocate their attention based their overarching goal. Alternatively, I predicted that
individuals with low working memory capacity would make better allocation
decisions (i.e., spend more time on the task) and perform better when cued to
allocate based on the features of the task. Results found no support for the
proposed effects.
There were no contingent effects observed for working memory on the cue
type and performance relationship. The absence of this proposed moderating
effect of working memory could be associated to the absence of an effect of
working memory on allocation behavior, as discussed above. To reiterate, it is
likely that the allocation behaviors and related performance outcomes observed in
this study were a function of situational factors such as the time pressure
experienced by participants. Alternatively, to further speculate, the cues identified
(i.e., task- and goal-level cues) may, in reality, function in a different manner than
that proposed.
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My predictions were based on the assumptions that a) low working
memory is associated with poor performance under conditions of distractions, and
b) cueing at the level of the task would be effective only for those with low
working memory, and at the level of the goal only for high working memory
individuals. In other words, predictions about the effects of the two cue types
assumed that each cue would only be effective for a distinct group of individuals.
However, the actual mechanism of each cue might be equivalent or less distinct
that assumed, thereby attenuating any distinctions in the effect of working
memory. That is, regardless of the level, allocation cues may simply aid allocation
decision. While no interactive effect of working memory and cue type was
observed, there was evidence of an effect of task cue on efficiency.
A subset of participants exposed to the task cue were more efficient (i.e.,
completed the task more quickly) than those exposed to the goal and both task and
goal cues. This finding could be explained in a number for ways. For example, it
may suggest that task-level cueing activates a sense of urgency. Or, that goal and
both goal and task cueing places greater demand on cognitive resources, thereby,
increasing the amount of time needed to complete a task. Task-level cues, may
provide cognitive short-cuts during allocation situations, in comparison to the
more cognitively demanding cueing at the level of the goal (c.f., Gonzalez et al.,
2002). Specifically, allocation based on a goal, a top-down process, requires more
deliberation and controlled thinking—more cognitively demanding processes
(Evans, 2008; Ruthruff, et al., 2001; Schiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Therefore, the
alternative of allocating based on task information, a faster bottom-up process
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removes the need to engage in cognitively complex thinking and may facilitate
faster allocation decisions; resulting in more time available to complete the task
more quickly in comparison to the slower and analytical top-down alternative
(Schreij et al., 2008). The absence of an observed effect of cue type on task
accuracy highlights the importance of considering the performance measure in
resource allocation contexts.
Efficiency is unique as a performance measure because it accounts for
input relative to output in comparison to measures accounting for output only
(e.g., effectiveness, accuracy); therefore, efficiency is more likely to capture the
process benefits of an intervention (Beal, Cohen, Burke, & McLendon, 2003).
Measures of efficiency often consider inputs including time or effort. Findings
from the current study imply a more proximal relationship between bottom-up
processing (i.e., task-level cueing only) and efficiency in comparison to cues
involving top-down processing (i.e., goal-level or task and goal-level). Therefore,
this reinforces the value of specifying performance dimensions for any
intervention aimed at enhancing resource allocation-related performance.
Practical and Theoretical Implications
This study has several practical and theoretical implications. First,
managers interested in enhancing resource allocation-related performance may
consider interventions geared at bottom-up attentional regulation for tasks where
efficiency is a valued outcome. A consideration of stimulus- or task-level features
when allocating attention between competing demands may help to reduce the
time typically needed to deliberate an allocation decision. To activate bottom-up
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allocation during task performance, first, employees should be made aware of the
tasks or responsibilities that are of priority to their organizations or teams.
Second, when demands arise outside of prioritized activities, the nature of these
demands should be made salient to employees. For example, if an urgent issue
arises that is unrelated to a prioritized activity, the urgency of this issue should be
clearly communicated. As an example, flagging an email as urgent (a task-level
cue), will help employees to more quickly decide on how to allocate their
attention; resulting in a positive spillover effect on efficiency for the main task.
In addition to making task-level stimuli more salient, managers may also
consider cue recognition training to enhance situational awareness (Grossman et
al., 2014). To develop this training, managers would first need to identify the
organization’s needs related to resource allocation, as well as the content of, and
target for training (Brown, 2002). For example, this assessment would identify the
primary interests of the organization that should first be prioritized and the
features of secondary activities that should serve as cues indicating when these
subordinate demands should be given immediate attention (e.g., an urgent email
from a particular client). Following this, training can be designed to guide
employees’ attention to crucial task- or stimulus-level features—providing
internal context to enhance allocation decisions. In addition to practical
implications, this study has implications for theory.
The effect observed of task-related cues on efficiency as a performance
outcome highlights an interesting theoretical implication regarding the
operationalization of task performance. The effect of task-related cues on task
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efficiency, and not task accuracy, highlights the theoretical (and ultimately
practical) significance of carefully attending to the conceptualization and
measurement of performance as a criterion within the organizational psychology
literature (Austin & Villanova, 1992). Specifically, findings from the current
study support the value of using multiple criteria, rather than a composite
measure, of task performance when studying performance as an outcome,
(Schmidt & Kaplan, 1971). Both the difference in effects observed for efficiency
and accuracy as well as the lack of any correlation between the two task
performance dimensions support a multi-dimensional approach. Within the
domain of resource allocation-related performance, the current findings imply that
considerations made and interventions used during the allocation process may
have differential impact on task performance. Additional theoretical implications
also relate to the foundational theories applied to this study.
This study tested the application of both resource and naturalistic decision
making theories to resource allocation and subsequent performance. From an
academic perspective the discoveries of this study present a number of potential
implications for both theories. Naturalistic decision making has traditionally been
applied to extreme decision making situations such as those encountered by
firefighters and medical decision-makers; however, suggestions have been made
supporting its application to more general work contexts (Grossman et al., 2014).
I expected that by theoretically matching cues to an individual difference,
allocation decisions could be primed similarly to enhancing cue recognition, as
discussed by naturalistic decision making theory (Klein, 1998; Klein, 2008).
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However, failing to find support for this prediction implies that appropriate cues
may be more contextually-driven. That is, rather than expecting that individuals
would attend to cues based on their ability levels, it is possible that cues related to
motivational states or situational demands might be more appropriate for
influencing allocations decisions. The naturalistic decision making framework has
made tremendous contributions to the literature in terms of identifying the cue
recognition patterns of expert decision makers. An understanding of “cue fit”
based on context would expand the application of naturalistic decision making to
additional areas within the literature.
Further, resource allocation has often been approached from a
motivational perspective, one that has significantly contributed to understanding
allocation patterns (e.g., Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Schmidt et al., 2009).
However, very often, organizational psychologists fail to apply decision making
theories to topics central to the process of decision making (Dalal, Bonaccio,
Highhouse, Ilgen, Mohammed, & Slaughter, 2010). Resource allocation might be
one such example. Naturalistic decision making was applied given the dynamic
nature of the resource allocation process; results indicate some promise for its
application to the resource allocation problem. Specifically, it was observed that a
reliance on particular types of cues to aid allocation decisions may have a positive
effect on task efficiency. However, that is not to say that other decision making
theories are not applicable to the process. Therefore, future research on the
application of alternative decision making approaches such the dual process
framework (Evans, 2008), adaptive decision making (Hammond, 1955), and fast
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and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) may also be viable areas to
consider for understanding resource allocation.
Future Research
There are several other rich areas for future research based on the above
findings. First, this study found support for the effect of cueing stimulus- or taskdirected attention allocation. It is reasonable to suspect that in addition to task
cues, more specific cue types might also be effective at guiding better allocation
decisions and influencing related performance outcomes. For example, resource
theories highlight the role of task features, such as difficulty, as a relevant
contextual variable to the resource allocation process (Langholtz et al., 1994).
Further, additional features of the work context such as time, social structure, and
accountability (Johns, 2006) may also impact allocation decisions. Understanding
any moderating effects of these features, as well as determining the appropriate
cueing strategies based on contextual differences and demands are promising
areas for future research.
In addition to contextual features, future research may explore the
interactive effects of working memory capacity with other individual differences
such as personality differences. While no effect of working memory was observed
in this study, the motivating effect of context was proposed as a potential
explanation for this finding (or lack thereof). Exploring motivation-related
individual differences might provide further nuanced explanations for the varying
effects of working memory. Variables such as conscientiousness and goal
orientation that positively relate to job performance (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998;
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VandeWalle et. al, 2001), may supplement limits to cognitive resources such as
low working memory capacity. In highly distracting situations, where adequate
contextual signals (such as time pressure) are absent, a conscientious individual
may possess internal cueing mechanisms to aid appropriate attentional allocation
decisions and practices. Or, an individual high on mastery goal orientation may
appropriately select amongst activities to accelerate goal accomplishment
(Schmidt et al., 2009). In this study avoid performance goal orientation and
conscientiousness were significantly related task accuracy. It could be that these
variables, rather than working memory, are more important for predicting
sustained accuracy in the resource allocation context. Future research exploring
these effects is viable for better understanding the nature of allocation decisions.
Finally, the reliance on teams has increased significantly as organizations
attempt to address more complex issues (Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson,
2008). Often, teams are composed of individuals with competing priorities or
serving on multiple teams (O'leary, Mortensen, & Woolley, 2011). Resource
allocation is a critical research domain with relevance to the organizational teams’
literature. Future research exploring antecedents of effective allocation decisions
is a domain worth exploring. For example, team composition and emergent states
such as transactive memory might be relevant predictors of resource allocation
decisions.
Limitations
This study had some methodological limitations that could have
influenced the results. First, the study used an experimental design with a sample
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of undergraduate students at a single time point. An experimental design was
selected to enhance the internal validity of the study’s findings. However, internal
validity often comes at the expense of external validity. Therefore, before making
generalizations based on the observed findings, replication of the study’s results
using an applied sample is necessary. Further, the task design accounted for a
single performance period. This may have limited the possibility of more robust
effects emerging, in comparison to a longitudinal design. In particular, given the
dynamic nature of resource allocation and observations of allocation behaviors
changing over time (Atkinson & Birch, 1978), a design accounting for temporal
effects may have provided opportunities for additional findings.
Second, an alternative operationalization of attention could have produced
different results. While the ManicTime software was extremely useful for
tracking time, as a proxy for attention, this operationalization of time/attention
might have resulted in the loss of some information. For example, when an e-mail
was received, a participant may not have clicked on the link to open it, but may
have spent several milliseconds reading the title of the e-mail. ManicTime would
not have recorded off-task time in this situation. A more precise measure of
attention such as eye-tracking could have provided a more valid measure of
attention.
Conclusion
The opening illustration describes Beth as she attempts to complete a
revision and resubmission while being distracted by e-mails. This situation, and
others of greater magnitude, is a familiar one to many employees. The above
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research proposed that a solution for Beth, and others like her, could be found by
considering Beth’s working memory capacity. This prediction was not supported.
However, a question remains as to whether the use of cues is ever effective.
With the proliferation of technological and other advancements,
organizational environments have become increasingly distracting. These
distractions are associated with significant productivity and financial losses.
Understanding contextual and individual differences associated with effective
allocation decisions is a valuable domain for research. This study found that
cueing individuals to allocate their attention based on features of the task might be
associated with more efficient task performance. This effect implies that
interventions reinforcing or making task features more salient, may support
efficiency within distracting work contexts. Therefore, while allocation cues may
be effective, this effectiveness might be contingent upon the operationalization of
task performance.

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

99
References

Aiken, L. S. & West, S. G. (1991), Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting
interactions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
Atkinson, J. W., & Birch, D. (1978). The dynamic theory of action. New York,
NY: Wiley.
Austin, J. T., & Villanova, P. (1992). The criterion problem: 1917-1992.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 77, 836-874.
Baddeley, A. (2000). The episodic buffer: A new component of working
memory? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 417-423.
Baddeley, A. (2003). Working memory: looking back and looking forward.
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4, 829-839.
Baddeley, A. D., Gathercole, S. E. & Papagno, C. (1998). The phonological loop
as a language learning device. Psychological Review, 105, 158–173.
Bakker, A. B., & Demerouti, E. (2007). The job demands-resources model: State
of the art. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 22, 309-328.
Ball, C. T., Langholtz, H. J., Auble, J., & Sopchak, B. (1998). Resource-allocation
strategies: A verbal protocol analysis. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 76, 70-88.
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable
distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and
statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 51, 1173-1182.
Barrick, M. R., & Mount, M. K. (1991). The Big Five personality dimensions and

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

100

job performance: A meta‐analysis. Personnel Psychology, 44, 1-26.
Beal, D. J., Cohen, R. R., Burke, M. J., & McLendon, C. L. (2003). Cohesion and
performance in groups: A meta-analytic clarification of construct
relations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, 989-1004.
Bosco, F., Allen, D. G., & Singh, K. (2015). Executive attention: An alternative
perspective on general mental ability, performance, and subgroup
differences. Personnel Psychology, 68, 859-898.
Breusch, T. S., Pagan, A. R. (1979). A simple test for heteroscedasticity and
random coefficient variation". Econometrica, 47, 1287–1294.
Broadbent, D. A. (1958). Perception and communication. London, England:
Pergamon Press.
Brown, J. (2002). Training needs assessment: A must for developing an effective
training program. Public Personnel Management, 31, 569–578.
Bühner, M., König, C. J., Pick, M., & Krumm, S. (2006). Working memory
dimensions as differential predictors of the speed and error aspect of
multitasking performance. Human Performance, 19, 253-275.
Cappelli, P., & Sherer, P. D. (1991). The missing role of context in OB-the need
for a meso-level approach. Research in Organizational Behavior, 13, 55110.
Carvalho, P. V., Dos Santos, I. L., & Vidal, M. C. (2005). Nuclear power plant
shift supervisor's decision making during microincidents. International
Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, 35, 619-644.
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1990). Origins and functions of positive and

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

101

negative affect: A control-process view. Psychological Review, 97, 19-35.
Chatterjee, S., & Hadi, A. S. (1988). Impact of simultaneous omission of a
variable and an observation on a linear regression quation. Computational
Statistics & Data Analysis, 6, 129-144.
Chen, G., Gully, S. M., & Eden, D. (2001). Validation of a new general selfefficacy scale. Organizational Research Methods, 4, 62-83.
Cherry, E. C. (1953). Experiments on the recognition of speech with one and two
ears. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 25, 975–979.
Cole, M. S., Walter, F., & Bruch, H. (2008). Affective mechanisms linking
dysfunctional behavior to performance in work teams: A moderated
mediation study. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93, 945-958.
Conway, A. R. A., Cowan, N., Bunting, M. F., Therriault, D. J., & Minkoff, S. R.
B. (2002). A latent variable analysis of working memory capacity, shortterm memory capacity, processing speed, and general fluid intelligence.
Intelligence, 30, 163–183.
Cowan, N., Elliott, E. M., Saults, J. S., Morey, C. C., Mattox, S., Hismjatullina,
A., & Conway, A. R. (2005). On the capacity of attention: Its estimation
and its role in working memory and cognitive aptitudes. Cognitive
Psychology, 51, 42-100
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 155-159.
Dalal, R. S., Bonaccio, S., Highhouse, S., Ilgen, D. R., Mohammed, S., &
Slaughter, J. E. (2010). What if industrial–organizational psychology
decided to take workplace decisions seriously? Industrial and

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

102

Organizational Psychology, 3, 386-405.
Dantzig, G. B. (1963). Linear programming and its extensions. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
De Guinea, A. O., & Webster, J. (2011). Are we talking about the task or the
computer? An examination of the associated domains of task-specific and
computer self-efficacies. Computers in Human Behavior, 27, 978-987.
Deutsch, J. A., & Deutsch, D. (1963). Attention: Some theoretical considerations.
Psychological Review, 70, 80–90.
Dijksterhuis, A., & Aarts, H. (2010). Goals, attention, and (un) consciousness.
Annual Review of Psychology, 61, 467-490.
Dweck, C.S., & Leggett, E. L. (1988). A social-cognitive approach to motivation
and personality. Psychological Review, 95, 256-273.
Edwards, J. R., & Lambert, L. S. (2007). Methods for integrating moderation and
mediation: A general analytical framework using moderated path analysis.
Psychological Methods, 12, 1-22.
Elliot, A. J., Maier, M. A., Binser, M. J., Friedman, R., & Pekrun, R. (2009). The
effect of red on avoidance behavior in achievement contexts. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 365-375.
Endsley, M. R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic
systems. Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and
Ergonomics Society, 37, 32-64.
Endler, N. S., & Magnusson, D. (1976). Toward an interactional psychology of
personality. Psychological Bulletin, 83, 956-974.

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

103

Endsley, M. R., & Garland, D. J. (2000, July). Pilot situation awareness training
in general aviation. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and
Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 44, 357-360.
Engle, R. W. (2002). Working memory capacity as executive attention. Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 19–23
Engle, R. W., Tuholski, S. W., Laughlin, J. E., & Conway, A. R. A. (1999).
Working memory, short-term memory, and general fluid intelligence: A
latent-variable approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
128, 309-331
Erez, M. (1977). Feedback: A necessary condition for the goal settingperformance relationship. Journal of Applied Psychology, 62, 624-627.
Evans, J. S. B. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and
social cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 255-278.
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A. G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G* Power 3: A
flexible statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and
biomedical sciences. Behavior Research Methods, 39, 175-191.
Fisher, C. D. (2008). What if we took within-person performance variability
seriously? Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 1, 185-189.
Forgas, J. P. (2011). Affective influences on self-disclosure: mood effects on the
intimacy and reciprocity of disclosing personal information. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 449-461.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way:
models of bounded rationality. Psychological Review, 103, 650-669.

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

104

Geisinger, K. F. (2001). Review of the Wonderlic Personnel Test and scholastic
level exam. In B. S. Plake & J. C. Impara (Eds.), The fourteenth Mental
Measurements Yearbook (pp. 1360–1363). Lincoln, NE: The Buros
Institute of Mental Measurements. NE: The Buros Institute of Mental
Measurements.
Gingrich, G., & Soli, S. D. (1984). Subjective evaluation and allocation of
resources in routine decision making. Organizational Behavior and
Human Performance, 33, 187-203.
Goldberg, L. R., Johnson, J. A., Eber, H. W., Hogan, R., Ashton, M. C.,
Cloninger, C. R., & Gough, H. C. (2006). The International Personality
Item Pool and the future of public-domain personality measures. Journal
of Research in Personality, 40, 84-96.
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1996). The volitional benefits of planning. The Psychology of
Action: Linking Cognition and Motivation to Behavior, 13, 287-312.
Gonzalez, R. M., Langholtz, H. J., & Sopchak, B. (2002). Minimizing cost in
resource-allocation decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 89, 1032-1057.
Goodwin, G.F., Burke, C.S., Wildman, J.L., & Salas, E. (2009). Team
effectiveness in complex organizations: An overview. In E. Salas, G.F.
Goodwin, & C.S. Burke (Eds.), Team effectiveness in complex
organizations. Cross-Disciplinary perspectives and
approaches (pp. 3-16). New York: Psychology Press.
Grossman, R., Spencer, J. M., & Salas, E. (2014). Enhancing naturalistic decision

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

105

making and accelerating expertise in the workplace: Training strategies that
work. In S. Highhouse, R. Dalal & E. Salas (Eds.), Judgment and decision
making at work (pp. 277–325). New
York, NY: Routledge.
Gu, Y., Botti, S., & Faro, D. (2013). Turning the page: The impact of choice
closure on satisfaction. Journal of Consumer Research, 40, 268-283.
Hambrick, D. Z., Oswald, F. L., Darowski, E. S., Rench, T. A., & Brou, R.
(2010). Predictors of multitasking performance in a synthetic work
paradigm. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 24, 1149-1167.
Hammond, K. R. (1955). Probabilistic functioning and the clinical method.
Psychological Review, 62, 255-262.
Harvey, N. (2011). Learning judgment and decision making from feedback: An
exploration-exploitation trade- off?” In Judgment and decision making as
a Skill: Learning, development, and evolution, Eds M. K. Dhami, A.
Schlottmann,and M. Waldmann Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hayes, A. F. (2015). An index and test of linear moderated mediation.
Multivariate Behavioral Research, 50, 1-22.
Hayes, A. F. (2013a). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional
process analysis: A regression-based approach. Guilford Press.
Hayes, A. (2013b). Model templates for PROCESS for SPSS and SAS. Retrieved
from http://www.afhayes.com/public/templates.pdf.
Hayes, A. F., & Preacher, K. J. (2014). Statistical mediation analysis with a

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

106

multicategorical independent variable. British Journal of Mathematical and
Statistical Psychology, 67, 451-470.
Hayes, A. F., & Cain, L. (2007). Using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
error estimators in OLS regression: An introduction and software
implementation. Behavior Research Methods, 39, 709–722
Henry, D. B., Tolan, P. H., & Gorman-Smith, D. (2005). Cluster analysis in
family psychology research. Journal of Family Psychology, 19, 121-132.
Highhouse, S., Dalal, R. S., & Salas, E. (Eds.). (2013). Judgment and decision
making at work. NY, New York: Routledge.
Hobfoll, S. E. (1989). Conservation of resources: A new attempt at
conceptualizing stress. American Psychologist, 44, 513-524.
Hofmann, D. A., Jacobs, R., & Gerras, S. J. (1992). Mapping individual
performance over time. Journal of Applied Psychology, 77, 185-195.
Hollenbeck, J. R., Ilgen, D. R., Phillips, J. M., & Hedlund, J. (1994). Decision
risk in dynamic two-stage contexts: Beyond the status quo. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 79, 592-598.
James, W. (1883). The principles of psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Johns, G. (2006). The essential impact of context on organizational
behavior. Academy of Management Review, 31(2), 386-408.
Johnston, W. A., & Dark, V. J. (1986). Selective attention. Annual Review of
Psychology, 37, 43-75.
Kahneman, D. (1973). Attention and effort. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

107

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision
under risk. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 263-291.
Kanfer, R., & Ackerman, P. L. (1989). Motivation and cognitive abilities: An
integrative/aptitude-treatment interaction approach to skill
acquisition. Journal of Applied Psychology, 74, 657-690.
Kane, M. J., Bleckley, M. K., Conway, A. R., & Engle, R. W. (2001). A
controlled-attention view of working-memory capacity. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 130, 169-183.
Kane, M. J., & Engle, R. (2003). Working-memory capacity and the control of
attention: The contributions of goal neglect, response competition, and
task set to Stroop interference. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 132, 47-70.
Kernan, M. C., & Lord, R. G. (1990). Effects of valence, expectancies, and goalPerformance discrepancies in single and multiple goal environments.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 75, 194-203.
Kiesler, S., & Sproull, L. (1982). Managerial responses to changing
environments: Perspectives on problem sensing from social cognition.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 21, 548-570.
Klein, G. (1998). Sources of power: How people make decisions. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Klein, 2008, Naturalistic decision making. Human Factors, 50, 456–460.

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

108

Kluger, A. N., & DeNisi, A. (1996). The effects of feedback interventions on
performance: a historical review, a meta-analysis, and a preliminary
feedback intervention theory. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 254-284.
Konig, C. J., Buhner, M., & Murling, G. (2005). Working memory, fluid
intelligence, and attention are predictors of multitasking performance, but
polychronicity and extraversion are not. Human Performance, 18, 243-266
Kruglanski, A. W., Thompson, E. P., Higgins, E. T., Atash, M., Pierro, A., Shah,
J. Y., & Spiegel, S. (2000). To “do the right thing’ or to “just do it”:
Locomotion and assessment as distinct self-regulatory
imperatives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 793-815.
Krull, J. L., & MacKinnon, D. P. (1999). Multilevel mediation modeling in groupbased intervention studies. Evaluation Review, 23, 418-444.
Krull, J. L., & MacKinnon, D. P. (2001). Multilevel modeling of individual and
group level mediated effects. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 36, 249277.
Krumm, S., Schmidt-Atzert, L., & Lipnevich, A. A. (2013). Call for Papers:
“Insights Beyond g–Specific Cognitive Abilities at Work”. Journal of
Personnel Psychology, 12, 60-61.
Langholtz, H. J., Ball, C., Sopchak, B., & Auble, J. (1997). Resource-allocation
behavior in complex but commonplace tasks. Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 70, 249-266.
Langholtz, H., Gettys, C., & Foote, B. (1993). Resource-allocation behavior under

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

109

certainty, risk, and uncertainty. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 54, 203-224.
Langholtz, H., Gettys, C., & Foote, B. (1994). Allocating resources over time in
benign and harsh environments. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 58, 28-50.
Lant, T. K., & Hewlin, P. F. (2002). Information cues and decision Making: The
effects of learning, momentum, and social comparison in competing
teams. Group & Organization Management, 27, 374-407.
Latham, G. P., & Locke, E. A. (1991). Self-regulation through goal setting.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50, 212-247.
Lavie, N., Hirst, A., de Fockert, J. W., & Viding, E. (2004). Load theory of
selective attention and cognitive control. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 133, 339–354.
Lewin, K. (1999). Experiments in social space (1939). Reflections The SoL
Journal, 1, 7-13.
Lipshitz, R., Klein, G., Orasanu, J., & Salas, E. (2001). Taking stock of
naturalistic decision making. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 14,
331-352.
Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (2002). Building a practically useful theory of goal
setting and task motivation: A 35-year odyssey. American Psychologist,
57, 705-717.
Lord, R. G., & Levy, P. E. (1994). Moving from cognition to action: A control
theory perspective. Applied Psychology, 43, 335-367.

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

110

Luther, N. (2000). Integrity testing and job performance within high performance
work teams: A short note. Journal of Business and Psychology, 15, 19-25.
Mann. K., Mitchell, T., Brown, S. G., & Towler, A. (2013, May). Charismatic
training agents and trainee reactions: The case of performance-oriented
trainees. Poster presented at the Association of Psychological Science
Conference 2013, Washington, D.C.
Mathieu, J., Maynard, M. T., Rapp, T., & Gilson, L. (2008). Team effectiveness
1997-2007: A review of recent advancements and a glimpse into the
future. Journal of Management, 34, 410-476.
Minbashian, A., & Luppino, D. (2014). Short-term and long-term within-person
variability in performance: An integrative model. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 99, 898-914.
Mischel, W. 1999. Implications of person-situation interaction: Getting over the
field’s borderline personality disorder. European Journal of Personality,
13, 455-461.
Mischel, W. (1973). Toward a cognitive social learning reconceptualization of
personality. Psychological Review, 80, 252-283.
Mitchell. T. D., Brown, S. G., Mann, K. E., & Towler, A. (2014, May). Three to
tango: Agent, feedback-comparison, and goal-orientation on training
outcomes. Poster presented at the Society for Industrial/Organizational
Psychology Conference, Honolulu, HI.
Norman, D. A., & Bobrow, D. G. (1975). On data-limited and resource-limited
processes. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 44-64.

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

111

Northcraft, G. B., & Neale, M. A. (1986). Opportunity costs and the framing of
resource allocation decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 37, 348-356.
Newman, S. D., & Soylu, F. (2014). The impact of finger counting habits on
arithmetic in adults and children. Psychological Research, 78, 549-556.
Oberauer, K., Süß, H. M., Wilhelm, O., & Wittman, W. W. (2003). The multiple
faces of working memory: Storage, processing, supervision, and
coordination. Intelligence, 31, 167-193.
O’Brien, R. M. (2007). A caution regarding rules of thumb for variance inflation
factors. Quality & Quantity, 41, 673-690.
O'leary, M. B., Mortensen, M., & Woolley, A. W. (2011). Multiple team
membership: A theoretical model of its effects on productivity and
learning for individuals and teams. Academy of Management Review, 36,
461-478.
Orasanu, J. & Connolly, T. (1993) The reinvention of decision making, In: G. A.
Klein, J. Orasanu, R. Calderwood & C. E. Zsambok (Eds) Decision
making in action: Models and Methods. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Osman, M. (2012). The role of reward in dynamic decision making. Frontiers in
Neuroscience, 6, 1-12.
Pashler, H., Johnston, J. C., & Ruthruff, E. (2001). Attention and performance.
Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 629-651.
Paterson, L., & Goldstein, H. (1991). New statistical methods for analyzing social

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

112

structures: An introduction to multilevel models. British Educational
Research Journal, 17, 387-393.
Payne, J. W. (1982). Contingent decision behavior. Psychological Bulletin, 92,
382-402.
Pinder, C. C. (1998). Expectancy-valence theories of work motivation. In Work
motivation in Organizational Behavior (pp. 337–364). Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice Hall
Pinto, Y., van der Leij, A. R., Sligte, I. G., Lamme, V. A., & Scholte, H. S.
(2013). Bottom-up and top-down attention are independent. Journal of
Vision, 13, 16-16.
Posner, M. I. (1980). Orienting of attention. Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 32, 3-25.
Preacher, K. J. (2015). Advances in mediation analysis: A survey and synthesis of
new developments. Annual Review of Psychology, 66, 825-852.
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating
indirect effects in simple mediation models. Behavior Research Methods,
Instruments, & Computers, 36, 717-731.
Preacher, K. J., & Kelley, K. (2011). Effect size measures for mediation models:
Quantitative strategies for communicating indirect effects. Psychological
Methods, 16, 93-115.
Press Association (2015, April 15. Distractions 'costing firms £250m'. Retrieved
May 11, 2015, from http://www.citationmachine.net/apa/cite-a-website
Randall, J. G., Oswald, F. L., & Beier, M. E. (2014). Mind-wandering, cognition,

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

113

and performance: A theory-driven meta-analysis of attention regulation.
Psychological Bulletin, 140, 1411-1431.
Ronay, R., Greenaway, K., Anicich, E. M., & Galinsky, A. D. (2012). The path to
glory is paved with hierarchy when hierarchical differentiation increases
group effectiveness. Psychological Science, 23, 669-677.
Roskes, M., De Dreu, C. K., & Nijstad, B. A. (2012). Necessity is the mother of
invention: Avoidance motivation stimulates creativity through cognitive
effort. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103, 242-256.
Redick, T. S., & Engle, R. W. (2006). Working memory capacity and Attention
Network Test performance. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20, 713–721.
Rieskamp, J., Busemeyer, J. R., & Laine, T. (2003). How do people learn to
allocate resources? Comparing two learning theories. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, 10661081.
Ruthruff, E., Remington, R. W., & Johnston, J. C. (2001). Switching between
simple cognitive tasks: The interaction of top-down and bottom-up factors.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 27, 1404-1419.
Sanbonmatsu, D. M., Strayer, D. L., Medeiros-Ward, N., & Watson, J. M. (2013).
Who multi-tasks and why? Multi-tasking ability, perceived multi-tasking
ability, impulsivity, and sensation seeking. PloS One, 8, 1-8.
Sanchez, J. I., & Levine, E. L. (2009). What is (or should be) the difference

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

114

between competency modeling and traditional job analysis? Human
Resource Management Review, 19, 53-63.
Schmidt, F. L. (2002). The role of general cognitive ability and job performance:
Why there cannot be a debate. Human Performance, 15, 187-210.
Schmidt, A. M., & DeShon, R. P. (2007). What to do? The effects of
discrepancies, incentives, and time on dynamic goal prioritization. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 92, 928-941.
Schmidt, A. M., & Dolis, C. M. (2009). Something’s got to give: The effects of
dual-goal difficulty, goal progress, and expectancies on resource
allocation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94, 678-691.
Schmidt, A. M., Dolis, C. M., & Tolli, A. P. (2009). A matter of time: Individual
differences, contextual dynamics, and goal progress effects on multiplegoal self-regulation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94, 692-709.
Schmidt, F. L., & Hunter, J. E. (1998). The validity and utility of selection
methods in personnel psychology: Practical and theoretical implications of
85 years of research findings. Psychological Bulletin, 124, 262-274.
Schmidt, F. L., Hunter, J. E., & Pearlman, K. (1981). Task differences as
moderators of aptitude test validity in selection: A red herring. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 66, 166-185.
Schmidt, F. L., & Kaplan, L. B. (1971). Composite vs. multiple criteria: A review
and resolution of the controversy. Personnel Psychology, 24, 419-434.
Schreij, D., Owens, C., & Theeuwes, J. (2008). Abrupt onsets capture attention

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

115

independent of top-down control settings. Attention, Perception, &
Psychophysics, 70, 208–218.
Schwartz, B., Ward, A., Monterosso, J., Lyubomirsky, S., White, K., & Lehman,
D. R. (2002). Maximizing versus satisficing: Happiness is a matter of
choice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1178-1197.
Shiffrin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic human
Information processing: II. Perceptual learning, automatic attending and a
general theory. Psychological Review, 84, 127-190.
Simon, H. A. (1972). Theories of bounded rationality. Decision and
Organization, 1, 161-176.
Singer, J. D. (1998). Using SAS PROC MIXED to fit multilevel models,
hierarchical models, and individual growth models. Journal of
Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 23, 323-355.
Sitzmann, T., & Ely, K. (2011). A meta-analysis of self-regulated learning in
work-related training and educational attainment: what we know and
where we need to go. Psychological Bulletin, 137, 421-442.
Sobel, K. V., Gerrie, M. P., Poole, B. J., & Kane, M. J. (2007). Individual
differences in working memory capacity and visual search: The roles of
top-down and bottom-up processing. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14,
840-845.
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2007). Using multivariate statistics (5th ed.).
Boston: Pearson/Allyn & Bacon.
Towler, A., Kraiger, K., Sitzmann, T., Van Overberghe, C., Cruz, J., Ronen, E., &

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

116

Stewart, D. (2008). The seductive details effect in technology‐delivered
instruction. Performance Improvement Quarterly, 21, 65-86.
Treisman, A. (1960). Contextual cues in selective listening. Quarterly Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 12, 242–248.
Treisman, A. M., & Gelade, G. (1980). A feature-integration theory of attention.
Cognitive Psychology, 12, 97-136.
Turner, M. L., & Engle, R. W. (1989). Is working memory capacity task
dependent? Journal of Memory & Language, 28, 127-154.
Unsworth, N., Heitz, R. P., Schrock, J. C., & Engle, R. W. (2005). An automated
version of the operation span task. Behavior Research Methods, 37, 498505.
Vancouver, J. B., Weinhardt, J. M., & Schmidt, A. M. (2010). A formal,
computational theory of multiple-goal pursuit: Integrating goal-choice and
goal-striving processes. Journal of Applied Psychology, 95, 985-1008.
VandeWalle, D. (1997). Development and validation of a work domain goal
orientation instrument. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 57,
995-1015.
Wee, S., Newman, D. A., & Joseph, D. L. (2014). More than g: Selection quality
and adverse impact implications of considering second-stratum cognitive
abilities. Journal of Applied Psychology, 99, 547-563.
Wood, L. A. (2011). The changing nature of jobs: A meta-analysis examining
changes in job characteristics over time (Unpublished Master’s Thesis,
University of Georgia).

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

117

Appendix A: Study Task

Instructions for Training
Before completing the experimental task, you will watch a video that will serve as
a training guide to prepare you for the task. This video will last for 15 minutes
and will be followed by a brief 10-minute questionnaire to assess what you have
learned.
Instructions for the Task
In this task, you will complete a series of questions which require you to perform
basic functions in Excel to answer the questions correctly. Completing the
questions correctly and as quickly as possible is how you gain points in this
task. Gaining as many points possible out of 36 is the goal of this task. While
answering the questions, you will also receive some e-mails. These e-mails will
include information that you may or may not find interesting. Attending to these
e-mails is entirely up to you.
(manipulation text inserted here)
Your objective is to gain as many points as possible in the session. The Excel
task is your most important responsibility and will allow you to earn up to 36
points. The 10 participants who have earned the most number of points will
receive a $25 Starbucks gift card at the end of the quarter. The research assistant
will take your name, and e-mail address, and record your total number of points
on a sheet at the end of the experiment if you are interested in entering the
competition for the gift card. Your name will not be linked to the other measures
you completed for the study.
Please submit your responses using the Qualtrics survey page opened and
minimized on your desktop. Please do not use the split-screen option as you
work on the files and remember to save your work.
You have 15 minutes to complete this task. If you are able to complete the task
in less than 15 minutes, you will receive a bonus in the number of points you
achieve based on the number of minutes you have remaining. For example, a
participant who completes the task in 10 minutes will receive 5 points in bonus
points while a participant who completes the task in 14 minutes will receive a 1point bonus. The researcher will let you know when you have 5 minutes
remaining.
Task:

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

118

A. The researchers defined “junior” participants as being below 18 years and
“senior” participants as being above 27 years. Color code each participant as
being “junior” (blue), or “senior” (yellow). Save your work after color coding.
1. How many participants are categorized as “junior”? 3 (1 point)
2. How many participants are categorized as “senior”? 12 (1 point)
B. Curious about living arrangements in their sample, the researchers wanted to
compare types of residences to the number of people living in these
residences.

1
2
3

Type of
Residence
Dormitory
Apartment
House
1. List the names of the people who live in a dorm, and also have 6 or
more people in residence: Albert, Joanne, George (3 points)

 Turn off filters and return to the original data set.
C. According to a different survey, Americans watch an average of 15 hours of
television per week.
1. How many participants in this study match exactly the national
average of 15 hours per week? 15 (1 point)

1
2

Sex
Female
Male
2. List the names of the males who watch more than 26 hours of TV per
week: Bradley, Mario, Robert, Lawrence, Steven, Don, Steve, George,
Paul, Albert, Louis, Frank, Carmen (13 points)

 Turn off filters and return to the original data set.
D. The researchers in this study were also interested in the types of college
students that credit card companies market their credit cards to. They
compared the 6 summer job types to the 5 categories of cards people carry.
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2
3
4
5
6

Summer Job Type
Managerial and Professional
Sales and Office
Service
Agricultural and Natural
Resources
Production, Craft, Repair
Operation, Fabrication,
General Labor
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1
2
3
4

Credit Card Type
American Express
Visa
Master Card
Discover

5

Other

1. List the names of the students with summer jobs in the service industry
who carry a card “other” than one of the major brands listed in the
survey: Debbie, Sheila, Laura, Ruby, Denise (5 points)
 Turn off filters and return to the original data set.
E. Politics are typically an important issue on college campuses. Color code all
participants who identify as “Liberal” or “Extremely Liberal” (below 3) as
blue, and all participants who identify as “Conservative” or “Extremely
Conservative” (above 5) as yellow.

1
2

In the last
election…
Voted
Did not vote

Political View
Extremely Liberal
Liberal
Slightly Liberal
Moderate
Slightly
Conservative
6 Conservative
7 Extremely
Conservative
1
2
3
4
5

1. Among those who voted in the last election, how many people identify
themselves as liberal or extremely liberal? 35 (1 point)
2. Among those who did not vote in the last election, how many people
identify themselves as conservative or extremely conservative? 20 (1
point)
 For the following task, please open Sheet 2 using the tab on the bottom
and use the data set on that sheet.
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F. Please create a chart showing the commute times of individuals. Save your
work after completing your chart. (5 points)
 For the following task, please open Sheet 3 using the tab on the bottom
and use the data set on that sheet.

G. Please create a chart showing the individuals’ hours of watching TV per week
for the participants who were born in October. Save your work after
completing your chart. (5 points)
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Appendix B: E-mails to be Sent During the Task

E-mail 1: Ideas on how to use your Starbucks Gift Card: 21 Best Starbucks
Drinks!
With so many delicious beverages, it might be hard to choose the best Starbucks
drinks, but I can help! I have 21 best Starbucks drinks you'll thoroughly enjoy!
Whether you like coffee or tea, iced, or hot, these beverages, will definitely
quench your thirst and keep you coming back for more! I know I'm guilty of this!
http://food.allwomenstalk.com/best-starbucks-drinks-to-enjoy

E-mail 2: 4 GMAIL HACKS THAT WILL CHANGE THE WAY YOU WORK
IF OPENING YOUR INBOX GIVES YOU A PANIC ATTACK, TRY THESE
SIMPLE MOVES TO MAKE GMAIL FEEL MORE MANAGEABLE.
BY MADISON FELLER, LEVO LEAGUE
I’ll be honest—I’ve had mixed feelings about Gmail. Sometimes it’s fantastic,
like when my best friend and I send each other cool links all morning while
simultaneously talking on Gchat. But other times, as I’m watching my inbox fill
up at the speed of light, it can just be overwhelming. Gmail and I have finally
come to a mutually respectful relationship (think Kanye’s post-VMA apology to
T-Swift), but it’s been a long road. These four hacks have paved the way, and
once you’ve got them down, I promise Gmail will feel like a whole new ball
game.
1. YOU CAN FAKE THE TIMESTAMP
As a self-proclaimed night owl, I never really thought anyone noticed my latenight e-mailing, until one morning I came into the office and my supervisor
(whom I’d e-mailed during a late-night catch-up binge) asked, "Were you
working at 2 a.m.?" Busted. I realized that if I wanted to be taken seriously, it
would be a lot better if my e-mails looked like they were being sent at 8 a.m.
instead of at 3 a.m. And then I discovered Boomerang.
Boomerang is a Gmail app that allows you to schedule e-mails, set up snooze
messages, and get reminders. You can easily schedule e-mails to go out at any
time, so it’ll look like you’re sending something at 8 a.m. on Monday, even
though you scheduled it at 11 p.m. the night before. You can also choose to
"boomerang" e-mails, meaning you can mark an e-mail to leave your inbox and
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return on a certain date. Let’s say there’s a reminder for a networking event next
month and as much as you want the e-mail, it’s cluttering your inbox. Just choose
to "boomerang" the message, so that it leaves your inbox for now but returns two
days before the event. You can also ask Boomerang to send you a reminder if
nobody replies to an e-mail, so you’ll never forget to follow up with people again.
Tip: When scheduling an e-mail, I do like to BCC myself just to be absolutely,
100% sure that everything is getting sent out.
2. YOU CAN INSTANTLY PULL UP SOMEONE’S NAME, TITLE, AND
MUTUAL CONNECTIONS
You know how before cold e-mailing someone important, you can spend a good
30 minutes stalking their LinkedIn profile, searching for any mutual connections,
and triple-checking the spelling of their first and last name? Well, Rapportive is
your new networking best friend. This Gmail extension will pull up LinkedIn
profiles right inside of Gmail, so you can see someone’s profile alongside your
message. Whether you’re sending or receiving an e-mail, Rapportive will give
you the quick information you need to make sure your message is accurate and
well-informed.
3. YOU CAN UNSEND A HASTILY WRITTEN MESSAGE
This new Gmail feature made headlines last week—and it’s true, whether you
fired off a nasty e-mail to your boss or any of these other five mistakes, you can
now take it back. Gmail’s new undo feature will let you unsend an e-mail up to 30
seconds after you hit send. To enable the feature, just click the gear in the top
right-hand corner of your Gmail window, go to Settings, scroll down to "Undo
Send", make sure the button is checked, and then save your changes.
Now after you send an e-mail, a yellow bar will appear at the top of your inbox,
asking if you would like to undo. I think I speak for everyone when I say this
magic button makes us breathe a huge sigh of relief.
4. YOU PLOW THROUGH YOUR INBOX IN RECORD SPEED
When my friend first told me about the Gmail keyboard shortcuts, I was
underwhelmed at the suggestion, even though she claimed she loved them. But
being one who doesn’t knock it till I try it, I decided to give them a whirl. And, oh
my, these shortcuts are a game changer. To enable them for Gmail, go to the gear
on the top right-hand corner of your main page, go to Settings, scroll down to
Keyboard Shortcuts, make sure they’re turned on, and then save your changes.
Now you can whiz through Gmail without (almost) ever leaving the keyboard.
Need to draft a new e-mail? Just press "c." Need to mark something as important?
Just press "+." Need to mark an e-mail unread? It’s as easy as hitting "Shift and
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u." Get ready for your coworkers to be shocked (or at least impressed) by how
quickly you get through the morning e-mails.
This article originally appeared on Levo and is reprinted with permission.

E-mails 3: Discover the meaning and history behind your last name
Hi Participant,
Your last name gives you a sense of identity and helps you discover who you are
and where you come from.
Some of the interesting facts you'll learn about your surname:
Meaning and History
Where your family lived in the U.S. and U.K.
Average life expectancy
When your family immigrated to the U.S.
Common occupations
Service in the civil war
Visit here:
http://www.ancestry.com/learn/facts?o_xid=65782&o_lid=65782&o_sch=Extern
al+Paid+Media
E-mail 4: New Website Reveals Personal Information Even Google Can't Find

Ever try Googling someone only to come up with basic information and maybe a
link or two to an outdated social media profile? There's a new website going
around that promises to reveal much more than just a simple google search can
show you.
Been issued a speeding ticket? Failed to stop at a stop sign? What about your
family members? And friends? If you are like most of us, the answer to at least
one of those questions is “yes”—the vast majority of us have slipped up at least
once or twice.
An innovative new website—Instant Checkmate is now revealing the full “scoop”
on millions of Americans.
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Instant Checkmate aggregates hundreds of millions of publicly available criminal,
traffic, and arrest records and posts them online so they can easily be searched by
anyone. Members of the site can literally begin searching within seconds, and are
able to check as many records as they like (think: friends, family, neighbors, etc.
etc.).
Previously, if you wanted to research someone’s arrest records, you might have
had to actually go in to a county court office—in the appropriate county—and
formally request information on an individual. This process may have taken days
or weeks, or the information might not have been available at all. With websites
like Instant Checkmate, however, a background check takes just a few clicks of
the mouse, and no more than a minute or two.
Want to give it a real-world test? Pull your own report. You might reveal long
forgotten crimes you committed in your younger days. Even been busted for
possession of a fake ID? Been caught shoplifting? Get in trouble with the cops for
being rowdy at a bar? Instant Checkmate may reveal exactly when and where you
were arrested.
"You might reveal long forgotten crimes you committed in your younger days."
After that, search all of your family members. If your aunt gets a speeding ticket
every month, you’ll know. If your parents have kept arrests hidden from you, you
could uncover them instantly.
One of the most interesting aspects of Instant Checkmate is that it shows not only
criminal records, but also more general background information like marriage
records, divorce records, various types of licenses (medical, firearm, aviation,
etc.), previous addresses, phone numbers, birthdates, estimated income levels and
even satellite imagery of known addresses—it’s really pretty scary just how much
information is in these reports.
In addition to giving information on the specific person you search for, the report
also includes a scrolling list of “local sex offenders” for whatever region you’ve
searched—along with a map plotting out the locations of those offenders. Peruse
the ones that show up in your report. You might even discover someone you
know on the list.
"You might even discover someone you know on the list"
Prepared to be shocked? Anyone can start running background checks on Instant
Checkmate within a few seconds—just click this link to get started.

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

125

If you would like to search someone you know, click here.
E-mails 5: Google self-driving car involved in first injury accident
FILE - In this May 13, 2015, file photo, Google's self-driving Lexus car drives
along street during a demonstration at Google campus in Mountain View, Calif.
Google says that one of its self-driving cars has been involved in an injury
accident for the first time. The tech giant disclosed Thursday, July 16, 2015, that
one of its SUVs was rear-ended in its home city of Mountain View, and the three
people on board complained of minor whiplash. All were released from the
hospital soon after the July 1 collision. (AP Photo/Tony Avelar, File)
LOS ANGELES (AP) — Google Inc. revealed Thursday that one of its selfdriving car prototypes was involved in an injury accident for the first time.
In the collision, a Lexus SUV that the tech giant outfitted with sensors and
cameras was rear-ended in Google's home city of Mountain View, where more
than 20 prototypes have been self-maneuvering through traffic.
The three Google employees on board complained of minor whiplash, were
checked out at a hospital and cleared to go back to work following the July 1
collision, Google said. The driver of the other car also complained of neck and
back pain.
In California, a person must be behind the wheel of a self-driving car being tested
on public roads to take control in an emergency. Google typically sends another
employee in the front passenger seat to record details of the ride on a laptop. In
this case, there was also a back seat passenger.
Google has invested heavily as a pioneer of self-driving cars, technology it
believes will be safer and more efficient than human drivers.
This was the 14th accident in six years and about 1.9 million miles of testing,
according to the company. Google has said that its cars have not caused any of the
collisions — though in 2011 an employee who took a car to run an errand rearended another vehicle while the Google car was out of self-driving mode.
In 11 of the 14, Google said its car was rear-ended.
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In a blog posted Thursday, the head of Google's self-driving car program, Chris
Urmson, wrote that his SUVs "are being hit surprisingly often" by distracted
drivers, perhaps people looking at their phones.
"The clear theme is human error and inattention," Urmson wrote. "We'll take all
this as a signal that we're starting to compare favorably with human drivers."
In a telephone interview, Urmson said his team was exploring whether its cars
could do something to alert distracted drivers before a collision. Honking would
be one possibility, but Urmson said he worried that could start to annoy residents
of Mountain View.
According to an accident report that Google filed with the California Department
of Motor Vehicles about the July 1 crash:
Google's SUV was going about 15 mph in self-driving mode behind two other
cars as the group approached an intersection with a green light.
The first car slowed to a stop so as not to block the intersection — traffic on the
far side was not moving. The Google car and the other car in front of it also
stopped.
Within about a second, a fourth vehicle rear-ended the Google car at about 17
mph. On-board sensors showed the other car did not break.
The driver of that car reported "minor neck and back pain." The SUV's rear
bumper was slightly damaged, while the vehicle that struck it lost its front
bumper.
Mountain View police responded, but did not file an accident report.
___
Contact Justin Pritchard at http://twitter.com/lalanewsman

E-mail 6: Find Out How to Win a $100 Starbucks Gift Card Instead

Hi Participant!

How would you like to win a $100 Starbucks Gift card instead of a $25 Gift
Card?
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Interested? Here’s how you can.
To earn this gift card you will be required to recruit 10 participants to complete
this study within the next 2 weeks. In order to qualify, you MUST send an e-mail
to the researcher at shaniquebrown@outlook.com within the next 7 minutes. Emails sent after this time will not qualify for this opportunity. The e-mail
should include your name, e-mail address, contact number, the name and contact
information of the 10 people who you believe would be interested in participating
in this study. You are also required to include a 2-3 sentence summary of why you
believe each person would be interested in participating.
Entering for this $100 gift card will disqualify you from earning Sona Credits for
your participation today.

E-mail 7: Sign up for additional Experiments on Sona Systems
Have you signed up for enough studies on Sona for the quarter? Remember, you
need to earn at least 5 credits for each Introduction to Psychology class that you
are enrolled in.

For more information about the Research Participation signup system, students
can consult the psychology department web page (http://psychology.depaul.edu)
under “Research” or e-mail the Research Participation Coordinator
(psychexperiments@depaul.edu).

E-mail 8: Need Help Using Microsoft Excel?
Here are some tips on using Microsoft Excel
Greetings! In this tutorial, you'll learn about rows, columns, cells, worksheets
(spreadsheets), and workbooks. We'll discuss how to add rows and columns, and
how to move around in a worksheet. We'll learn how to enter data, and protect
cells and spreadsheets. We'll tell you everything you need to know to get started
using Microsoft Excel.
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If you like video-based introduction, check out Excel 2010 Tutorial for Beginners.
We have this course (over 9 hours of hands-on lessons) and find it very well done.
(You can watch some chapters online.)
Now - let's begin learning Microsoft Excel!
The Excel Worksheet (Spreadsheet) and Workbook
An Excel worksheet, or spreadsheet, is a two-dimensional grid with columns and
rows. Look at the spreadsheet below. The column names are letters of the
alphabet starting with A, and the rows are numbered chronologically starting with
the number one. The cells in the first row are A1, B1, C1, and so on. And the cells
in the first column are A1, A2, A3, and so on. These are called cell names or cell
references.
We use cell references when creating math formulas or functions. For example,
the formula to add the contents of cells B2 and B3 together is: =B2+B3. For more
information, see our tutorial Excel Math Basics: Writing Formulas and
Expressions.
Moving From Cell to Cell
The arrow keys can be used to move left, right, up, and down from the current
cell. Press the Enter key to move to the cell immediately below the current cell,
and press the Tab key to move one cell to the right.
Selecting Cells
There are a variety of ways to select cells in an Excel spreadsheet:
Excel 2010 missing manual
To select one cell, click in the cell.
To select one or more rows of cells, click on the row number(s).
To select one or more columns of cells, click on the column letter(s).
To select a group of contiguous cells, click in a corner cell and, with the left
mouse button depressed, drag the cursor horizontally and/or vertically until all of
the cells you want selected are outlined in black.
To select multiple cells that are not contiguous, press and hold the Ctrl key while
clicking in the desired cells.
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To select every cell in the worksheet, click in the upper right corner of the
worksheet to the left of "A."
Entering Data into Cells
To enter data into a cell, just click in the cell and begin typing. What you type
also displays in the Formula Bar. When entering dates, Excel defaults to the
current year if the year portion of the date is not entered.
You may edit cell contents from the Formula bar, or from directly inside the cell.
To edit from the Formula Bar, select the cell and click inside the Formula Bar.
When done typing, either press the Enter key or click inside another cell. To edit
directly inside a cell, either double click inside the cell, or select the cell and press
the F2 key.
Each cell has a specific format. This format tells Excel how the data inside the
cell should be displayed. See our separate tutorial on Formatting Cells in
Microsoft Excel.
Propagating Cell Contents
There are multiple ways to propagate or fill data from one cell to adjacent cells.
Let's begin with two popular keyboard shortcuts that allow us to fill down, or fill
to the right:
To fill adjacent cells with the contents of the cell above, select the cell with the
data and the cells to be filled and press Ctrl + D (the Ctrl key and the D key) to fill
down.
To fill adjacent cells with the contents of the cell to the left, select the cell with
the data and cells to be filled and press Ctrl + R (the Ctrl key and the R key) to fill
to the right.
To propagate in any direction, use the Fill Handle. Click in a cell with data to be
copied, hover the cursor over the cell's lower right corner until the cursor changes
to a thin plus sign (+) or a dark square, and drag up, down, left, or right to fill the
cells.
If the data to be copied is a date, number, time period, or a custom-made series,
the data will be incremented by one instead of just copied when the Fill Handle is
used. For example, to display the months of the year in column A, type January in
cell A1, drag the Fill Handle down to cell A12, and the months will display, in
order, in column A!
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Moving and Copying Cells
To move cell contents, right-click in the selected cell and click Cut. To copy cell
contents, click Copy. Then right-click in the new location and click Paste. To
paste a group of cells, right-click in the cell where the top left cell of the group
should be located, and click Paste. Remove the animated border around the
original cell by pressing the ESC key, or start typing in a new cell.
Adding and Deleting Rows and Columns
Excel 2010 Bible
To insert a new row in a spreadsheet, right-click on a row number, and click
Insert. Excel always inserts the row ABOVE the row that was clicked on. To
delete a row, right-click on the row number, and click Delete.
To insert a new column, right-click on a column letter and click Insert. Excel
always inserts the column to the LEFT of the column that was clicked on. To
delete a column, right-click on the column letter, and click Delete.
Protecting a Worksheet (Spreadsheet) or Workbook
To protect a worksheet or workbook in Excel 2007, click the Review tab, click
Protect Worksheet or Protect Workbook, and click OK (entering a password first,
if desired). When a worksheet or workbook is already protected, the icons in the
Review tab are Unprotect Worksheet and Unprotect Workbook.
In earlier versions of Excel, click Tools > Protection, click Protect Sheet or
Protect Workbook, and click OK (entering a password first, if desired). When a
worksheet or workbook is already protected, the menu items read Unprotect Sheet
and Unprotect Workbook.
Don't enter a password unless absolutely necessary. If you forget the password,
you won't be able to unprotect the worksheet, so you won't be able to change,
delete, or format any of the Locked cells!
Working with Worksheets (Spreadsheets)
Viewing, Renaming, Inserting, and Deleting Worksheets
Worksheet tabs are found in the bottom left area of the workbook. To view a
worksheet, click on its tab. If the workbook window is not wide enough to display
all of the tabs, use the arrows to the left of the tabs to navigate left or right, or
right-click on any of the arrows and select the tab from the list that displays.
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To rename a spreadsheet, right-click on the spreadsheet tab, select Rename from
the context menu, and type a new name. Or, double-click on the worksheet tab
and type a new name.
To insert a worksheet, right-click on a worksheet tab and select Insert from the
menu. Excel always inserts the spreadsheet to the left of the current worksheet.
To delete a worksheet, right-click on the worksheet tab and select Delete from the
context menu.
Author: Keynote Support
Moving Worksheets (Spreadsheets)
Sometimes we want our spreadsheets to be arranged in a different order. To move
a worksheet in the same workbook, right-click on the tab of the source worksheet
and click "Move or Copy." In the Move or Copy window, click the name of the
worksheet that you want the sheet to be inserted before, and click OK.
To move a spreadsheet to a new workbook, right-click on the tab of the source
spreadsheet and click "Move or Copy." In the Move or Copy window, click the
drop-down arrow under “To Book:” and click (new book). Excel removes the
worksheet from the existing workbook and opens a new workbook containing the
moved worksheet.
To move a worksheet to another existing workbook, we recommend copying the
worksheet as instructed below, and then deleting the original sheet when the
worksheet has been successfully pasted. Using cut and paste is an option, but if
something happens to the PC before pasting occurs, a valuable worksheet could
be lost.
Copying Worksheets (Spreadsheets)
Excel 2010 missing manual
Rather than start from scratch, it is often easier to copy, and then modify, an
existing worksheet. To copy a worksheet in the same workbook, right-click on the
tab of the source worksheet and click "Move or Copy." In the Move or Copy
window, check the “create a copy” box, click the name of the spreadsheet that you
want the sheet to be inserted before, and click OK.
To copy a worksheet into a new workbook, right-click on the tab of the source
worksheet and click "Move or Copy." In the Move or Copy window, click the
drop-down arrow under “To Book:” and click (new book). Excel opens a new
workbook containing the copied spreadsheet.
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To copy a worksheet from one workbook to another existing workbook, rightclick the top left corner cell to select all cells and click Copy. Open the other
Excel workbook, find an empty worksheet, right-click the top left corner cell to
select all cells, and click Paste. Return to the first worksheet and press ESC to
remove the animated border.
In Closing...
Excel error messages begin with a pound sign (#). The most common error,
#####, indicates that the cell is too narrow to display all of the data. Make the
column wider by placing the cursor on the right side of the column heading and
dragging the column edge to the right.
We hope this article has been helpful. If you want to learn more about Excel, and
you're interested in a video-based course, check out Excel 2010 Tutorial for
Beginners, with over 9 hours of hands-on lessons. We've reviewed it and it's a
good deal. Cheers!
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Appendix C: Cue Type Manipulation and Checks

Goal-Cue and Manipulation Check
When deciding how to attend to information in our environment, we often use a
top-down or goal-oriented strategy. This means that we may make decisions about
what to attend to based on the goals or expectations that we have. Using this
strategy allows us to be able to filter out irrelevant information that is not related
to our goal. Also, attending to information in our environment in a top-down
manner, or based on our goals, assists us in making better decisions about what is
important for us to attend to, and allows us to persist toward meeting our goal. For
example, you can set an overall goal to achieve as many points possible out of 36,
which will help you to focus on activities that help you to earn points. For
example, if you feel you are close to achieving your goal during the activity, you
will determine that you have more time to spend reading an e-mail; however, if
you feel that you are behind on achieving your goal, then you will put more effort
into completing another question quickly before reading an e-mail. Another
example of a goal is how you will plan you time. So, at the beginning of the task,
you may decide to check e-mails at specific intervals based on how you are
progressing on the task.
Please complete the following questions:
1)
Next to each question you will see the number of points that each question
is worth; please set a goal for yourself (number of points you would like to make).
What is the goal you have set for yourself during this activity?
__________________________________________________________________
___________
2)
What are the names of the strategies discussed in the instructions for
making decisions about attending to the e-mails?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
________________________
2)

What is one advantage of using this strategy?

__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
________________________
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3)
What is one recommendation to determine how to attend to the e-mails
based on this strategy?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
________________________

Task-Cue and Manipulation Check
When deciding how to attend to information in our environment, we often use a
bottom-up or stimulus-driven strategy. This means that we may make decisions
about what to attend to based on the nature of the information ‘popping up’ in our
environment. Using this strategy allows us to be able to filter out irrelevant
information based on how critical or urgent the information is. Also, attending to
information in our environment in a bottom-up manner, or based on the features
of the information assists us in making decisions about what we need to attend to
based on how critical that information is to us. In other words, if something “pops
up” that demands immediate attention, we tend to attend to that information
immediately. For example, if you receive an e-mail that is far more critical to you
than the task, then you may decide to attend to it immediately. One
recommendation as you complete the task is to consider how meaningful the emails are to you as you work on the Excel task; this will help you to determine
when you should reasonably attend to this information. Another recommendation
is to quickly scan the title of the e-mails as they pop-up to quickly determine if
you need to attend to them.
Please complete the following questions:
1) What is the name of the strategy discussed in the instructions for making
decisions about attending to the e-mails?
__________________________________________________________________
__________
2) What is one advantage of using this strategy?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
________________________
3) What is one recommendation to determine how to attend to the e-mails
based on this strategy?
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__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
________________________
Task and Goal Cues and Manipulation Check
When deciding how to attend to information in our environment, we often use one
of two strategies: a top-down or goal-oriented strategy or a bottom-up or stimulusdriven strategy.
A top-down strategy means that we may make decisions about what to attend to
based on the goals or expectations that we have. Using this strategy allows us to
be able to filter out irrelevant information that is not related to our goal. Also,
attending to information in our environment in a top-down manner, or based on
our goals, assists us in making better decisions about what is important for us to
attend to, and allows us to persist toward meeting our goal. For example, you can
set an overall goal to achieve as many points possible out of 36, which will help
you to focus on activities that help you to earn points. For example, if you feel
you are close to achieving your goal during the activity, you will determine that
you have more time to spend reading an e-mail; however, if you feel that you are
behind on achieving your goal, then you will put more effort into completing
another question quickly before reading an e-mail. Another example of a goal is
how you will plan you time. So, at the beginning of the task, you may decide to
check e-mails at specific intervals based on how you are progressing on the task.
A bottom-up strategy means that we may make decisions about what to attend to
based on the nature of the information ‘popping up’ in our environment. Using
this strategy allows us to be able to filter out irrelevant information based on how
critical or urgent the information is. Also, attending to information in our
environment in a bottom-up manner, or based on the features of the information
assists us in making decisions about what we need to attend to based on how
critical that information is to us. In other words, if something “pops up” that
demands immediate attention, we tend to attend to that information immediately.
For example, if you receive an e-mail that is far more critical to you than the task,
then you may decide to attend to it immediately. One recommendation as you
complete the task is to consider how meaningful the e-mails are to you as you
work on the Excel task; this will help you to determine when you should
reasonably attend to this information. Another recommendation is to quickly scan
the title of the e-mails as they pop-up to quickly determine if you need to attend to
them.
Please complete the following questions:
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Next to each question you will see the number of points that each question
is worth; please set a goal for yourself (number of points you would like to
make). What is the goal you’ve set for yourself during this activity?

__________________________________________________________________
__________

2)

What are the names of the strategies discussed in the instructions for
making decisions about attending to the e-mails?

__________________________________________________________________
__________
3)

What is one advantage of each strategy (one per strategy)?

__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
________________________
4)
What is one recommendation of each strategy to determine how to attend
to the e-mails?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
________________________
No Cues (No additional instructions.)
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Appendix D: Informed Consent (Online Pre-test)
ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
How Do You Decide? A Decision making Study: Part I
Principal Investigator: Shanique Brown
Institution: DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, USA
Department (School, College): Department of Psychology
Faculty Advisor: Suzanne Bell, Department of Psychology, College of Science
and Health
What is the purpose of this research?
We are asking you to be in a research study because we are trying to learn more
about decision making. This study is being conducted by Shanique Brown, a
graduate student at DePaul University as a requirement to obtain her Doctoral
degree. This research is being supervised by her faculty advisor, Suzanne Bell.
We hope to include about 180 people in the research.
Why are you being asked to be in the research?
You are invited to participate in this study because you are likely to engage in
some decision making behaviors on a daily basis. You must be age 18 or older to
be in this study. This study is not approved for the enrollment of people under the
age of 18.
What is involved in being in the research study?
If you agree to be in this study, being in the research involves completing a brief
online survey.
Once you have completed this portion of the study, you will be directed to
schedule the in-lab portion of the study.
How much time will this take?
This portion of the study will take about 30 minutes to complete.
Are there any risks involved in participating in this study?
Being in this study does not involve any risks other than what you would
encounter in daily life. You may feel uncomfortable or embarrassed about
answering certain questions. You do not have to answer any question you do not
want to.
Are there any benefits to participating in this study?
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You will not personally benefit from being in this study.
We hope that what we learn will help other researchers and practitioners to
improved resource allocation performance.
Is there any kind of payment, reimbursement or credit for being in this study?
You will be awarded .5 hour research credit for this portion of the study.
Are there any costs to me for being in the research?
There is no cost to you for being in the research.
Can you decide not to participate?
Your participation is voluntary, which means you can choose not to participate.
There will be no negative consequences, penalties, or loss of benefits if you
decide not to participate or change your mind later and withdraw from the
research after you begin participating.
Who will see my study information and how will the confidentiality of the
information collected for the research be protected?
The research records will be kept and stored securely. Your information will be
combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we
write about the study or publish a paper to share the research with other
researchers, we will write about the combined information we have gathered. We
will not include your name or any information that will directly identify you. We
will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from
knowing that you gave us information, or what that information is. However,
some people might review or copy our records that may identify you in order to
make sure we are following the required rules, laws, and regulations. For
example, the DePaul University Institutional Review Board may review your
information. If they look at our records, they will keep your information
confidential.

What if new information is learned that might affect my decision to be in the
study?
If we learn of new information or make changes to any portion of the study, and
the new information or changes might affect your willingness to stay in this study,
the new information will be provided to you. If this happens, you may be asked
to provide ongoing consent (in writing or verbally).
Who should be contacted for more information about the research?
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study,
please ask any questions that might come to mind now. Later, if you have
questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about the study or you want to get
additional information or provide input about this research, you can contact the
researcher, Shanique Brown at 618-560-3719 or sbrown82@depaul.edu.
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This research has been reviewed and approved by the DePaul Institutional Review
Board (IRB). If you have questions about your rights as a research subject you
may contact Susan Loess-Perez, DePaul University’s Director of Research
Compliance, in the Office of Research Services at 312-362-7593 or by e-mail at
sloesspe@depaul.edu.
You may also contact DePaul’s Office of Research Services if:




Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the
research team.
You cannot reach the research team.
You want to talk to someone besides the research team.

You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.
Statement of Consent from the Subject:
I have read the above information. I have had all my questions and concerns
answered. By signing below, I indicate my consent to be in the research.

Signature: _______________________________________________

Printed name: ____________________________________________

Date: _________________
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Please complete the following items.

1. What is you gender?
__ Male __ Female

2. What is your race/ethnicity?
__ Caucasian/White __ Black or African American
__ Asian/Pacific Islander __ American Indian or Alaska native
__ Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin

4. What is your age?
Age: ______

5. What is your current employment status?
__ Full time __ Part time
__ Not currently employed

5b. If employed, how many years of work experience do you have?

___ None

___ 6 months – 1 year

____1-2 years

___2-5 years

____5-10 years

___ more than 10 years

140
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Appendix F: Informed Consent (In-lab stage)

ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
How Do You Decide? A Decision making Study: Part II
Principal Investigator: Shanique Brown
Institution: DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, USA
Department (School, College): Department of Psychology
Faculty Advisor: Suzanne Bell, Department of Psychology, College of Science
and Health

What is the purpose of this research?
We are asking you to be in a research study because we are trying to learn more
about decision making. This study is being conducted by Shanique Brown, a
graduate student at DePaul University as a requirement to obtain her Doctoral
degree. This research is being supervised by her faculty advisor, Suzanne Bell.
We hope to include about 180 people in the research.
Why are you being asked to be in the research?
You are invited to participate in this study because you are likely to engage in
some decision making behaviors on a daily basis. You must be age 18 or older to
be in this study. This study is not approved for the enrollment of people under the
age of 18.
What is involved in being in the research study?
The exact procedure will involve:
 You will complete a series of pre-task measures for about 30 minutes.
 You will complete a 15-training on the use of Microsoft Excel, and a 10minute test of your understanding of the material presented in the training
 You will complete a 15-minute task.
 Finally, you will complete a brief measure lasting about 5 minutes.
How much time will this take?
This study will take about 75 minutes to complete.
Are there any risks involved in participating in this study?
Being in this study does not involve any risks other than what you would
encounter in daily life. You may feel uncomfortable or embarrassed about
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answering certain questions. You do not have to answer any question you do not
want to.
Are there any benefits to participating in this study?
You will not personally benefit from being in this study.
We hope that what we learn will help other researchers and practitioners to
improved resource allocation performance.
Is there any kind of payment, reimbursement or credit for being in this study?
You will be given 1.5 research credits for participating in the research. You must
provide your subject pool number in order to be given credit.
Are there any costs to me for being in the research?
There is no cost to you for being in the research.
Can you decide not to participate?
Your participation is voluntary, which means you can choose not to participate.
There will be no negative consequences, penalties, or loss of benefits if you
decide not to participate or change your mind later and withdraw from the
research after you begin participating.
Who will see my study information and how will the confidentiality of the
information collected for the research be protected?
The research records will be kept and stored securely. Your information will be
combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we
write about the study or publish a paper to share the research with other
researchers, we will write about the combined information we have gathered. We
will not include your name or any information that will directly identify you. We
will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from
knowing that you gave us information, or what that information is. However,
some people might review or copy our records that may identify you in order to
make sure we are following the required rules, laws, and regulations. For
example, the DePaul University Institutional Review Board may review your
information. If they look at our records, they will keep your information
confidential.

What if new information is learned that might affect my decision to be in the
study?
If we learn of new information or make changes to any portion of the study, and
the new information or changes might affect your willingness to stay in this study,
the new information will be provided to you. If this happens, you may be asked
to provide ongoing consent (in writing or verbally).
Who should be contacted for more information about the research?
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Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study,
please ask any questions that might come to mind now. Later, if you have
questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about the study or you want to get
additional information or provide input about this research, you can contact the
researcher, Shanique Brown at 618-560-3719 or sbrown82@depaul.edu.
This research has been reviewed and approved by the DePaul Institutional Review
Board (IRB). If you have questions about your rights as a research subject you
may contact Susan Loess-Perez, DePaul University’s Director of Research
Compliance, in the Office of Research Services at 312-362-7593 or by e-mail at
sloesspe@depaul.edu.
You may also contact DePaul’s Office of Research Services if:




Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the
research team.
You cannot reach the research team.
You want to talk to someone besides the research team.

You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.
Statement of Consent from the Subject:
I have read the above information. I have had all my questions and concerns
answered. By signing below, I indicate my consent to be in the research.

Signature: _______________________________________________

Printed name: ____________________________________________

Date: _________________

RESOURCE ALLOCATON

144

Appendix G: Recall Test (Baseline Performance)
1. Which formula could be used to calculate the sum of cells B2, B3, and B4?
a.) =sum(B2:B4)
b.) =sum(B2-B4)
c.) =average(B2:B4)
d.) =average(B2-B4)
2. The formula =B1+C1 is located in cell D1. If I dragged the curser down to cell
D4 the resulting formula would be:
A

B

C

D

1

2

4

5

=B1+C1

2

3

3

4

7

3

3

7

8

15

4

5

2

3

????????

5

4

3

4

7

a.)
b.)
c.)
d.)
above

=B3+A4
=C2+B1
=B4+C4
None of the

3. According to the training, the first steps in creating a chart are to:
a.) Highlight the data and click on the chart wizard icon
b.) Click on the chart wizard icon and enter data when prompted
c.) Use Excel’s drawing function to create the chart
d.) Highlight the data and label the X and Y axes
4. In order to create a chart to show the average rainfall in each city, I would need
to:
a.) Type Average Rainfall in the box labeled “Category (X) axis”
b.) Type City in the box labeled “Category (X) axis”
c.) Type City in the box labeled “Category (Y) axis”
d.) Both A & C are correct
A
1

City

2 Rome
3 Seoul
4 Singapore

B

C

Average temperature in Average Rainfall in
March
March
28.6

14.2

17

.8

12.7

3.2
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39

4.5

5. (Refer to the table above) In order to create a bar chart of the average
temperature in March for the Seoul, Singapore, and Stockholm, I would first need
to:
a.) Click on cell A1
b.) Left click and drag the cursor across cells A3 through B5
c.) Left click and drag the cursor across cells B3 through C5
d.) Left click and drag the cursor across cells B3 through B5
A

B

C

D

City

June High
Temperature

July High
Temperature

August High
Temperature

Hong
Kong

90

99

102

3 Istanbul
4 Kingston

78

80

79

90

89

94

5 London

73

76

79

1
2

6. Was conditional formatting and/or filtering used to select cities with an average
temperature in August that is over 90 degrees:
a.) Conditional formatting
b.) Filtering
c.) Both conditional formatting and filtering were used
7. The conditional formatting option can be found in what menu at the top of the
screen in Excel?
a.) Data
b.) Home
c.) Review
d.) Formulas
8. Using the Chart Wizard creates a chart using:
a.) The cell range(s) you selected
b.) All the data in the sheet
c.) The last formula you entered
d.) Data from columns A & B
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9. When using conditional formatting, press the ______ key to move to the
dialogue box on the right.
a.) Enter
b.) Tab
c.) Insert
d.) Ctrl
10. The filtering option can be found in what menu at the top of the screen in
Excel?
a.) Insert
b.) Page Layout
c.) View
d.) Data
11. From the filtering menu, what two pieces of information do you need to
provide?
a.) Comparisons (e.g., less than or greater than) and colors
b.) Colors and values (e.g., 65)
c.) Comparisons (e.g., less than or greater than) and values (e.g., 65)
d.) Comparisons (e.g., less than or greater than) and a range of cells (e.g., a4:j4)
12. Which Excel tool reduces the data that you see on screen?
a.) Chart Wizard
b.) Conditional formatting
c.) Filtering
d.) Inserting formulas
13. Which Excel tool highlights information by color?
a.) Chart Wizard
b.) Conditional formatting
c.) Filtering
d.) Inserting formulas
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Appendix H: Task-specific Self-Efficacy Measure

Now that you have read the instructions for task, please respond to the following
items indicating how confident you are in your ability to complete the upcoming
task.
0

10

20

30

Not at all Confident
Completely Confident

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Moderately Confident

1 – I feel confident that I can carry out the Excel task
2 – I believe I will be good at carrying out the task
3 – I will be able to perform this task easily
4 – I feel confident in my capabilities to perform the Excel task successfully
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Appendix I: Study Debrief

Thank you for your participation in our research study, How Do You Decide? A
Decision-making Study.
I would like to discuss with you in more detail the study you just participated in
and to explain exactly what we were trying to study.
Before I tell you about all the goals of this study, however, I want to explain why
it is necessary in some kinds of studies to not tell people all about the purpose of
the study before they begin.
As you may know, scientific methods sometimes require that participants in
research studies not be given complete information about the research until after
the study is completed. Although we cannot always tell you everything before you
begin your participation, we do want to tell you everything when the study is
completed.
We don't always tell people everything at the beginning of a study because we do
not want to influence your responses. If we tell people what the purpose of the
study is and what we predict about how they will react, then their reactions would
not be a good indication of how they would react in everyday situations.
In this study, we are trying to understand how people allocate their time while
working on a task but are faced with distractions. We are trying to better
understand if people who have high working memory capacity spend more or less
time on their task if they are told to focus on their goal. To assess this, you were
randomly assigned to either a condition where we asked you to focus on your
goal, or to a condition where we asked you to focus the nature of the information
related to the task. These different conditions represent either a top-down (goalfocus), or a bottom-up (task-focused) way of thinking. While you were working
on the task, we monitored the time you spent on each using the software called
ManicTime. This software keeps tracks of the time with spend working within a
program on a computer.
Additionally, one of the emails that you received during the study asked you to
provide contact information for additional participants for the study. This email,
like the other emails that you received during the task was only sent as a possible
distractor from the Excel task. There is no drawing for a $100 gift card. In the
event that you responded to the email with contact information for others, this
information will be discarded. Further, the email mentioned that entering the
drawing will disqualify you from earning Sona Credits for your participation
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today. This information was inaccurate—you will receive credit for your
participation as stated in the informed consent.
If other people knew the true purpose of the study, it might affect how they
behave/answer questions, so we are asking you not to share the information we
just discussed.
Now that the study has been explained, if you would like for your data to be
removed from the study, please inform the research assistant before leaving. If
you decide to have your data removed, we will remove both your pre-lab and lab
data.
I hope you enjoyed your experience and I hope you learned some things today. If
you have any questions later please feel free to Shanique Brown at
sbrown82@depaul.edu or by phone at 618-560-3719.
Thank you again for your participation.
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Appendix J: Screen-shots of Working Memory Test

Welcome page for Working Memory Test

Instructions for practice task (remembering letters)
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Sample correct response to practice task (remembering letters)

Sample incorrect response to practice task (remembering letters)
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Instructions to practice task for math problems

Instructions to practice task for remembering letters and solving math problems
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Appendix K: Conscientiousness Measure

Indicate your level of agreement with the extent to which the following statements
describe your own behavior on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree).

1= Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly Agree

+ keyed
Am always prepared.
Pay attention to details.
Get chores done right away.
Carry out my plans.
Make plans and stick to them.
Complete tasks successfully.
Do things according to a plan.
Am exacting in my work.
Finish what I start.
Follow through with my plans.

– keyed
Waste my time.
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Find it difficult to get down to work.
Do just enough work to get by.
Don't see things through.
Shirk my duties.
Mess things up.
Leave things unfinished.
Don't put my mind on the task at hand.
Make a mess of things.
Need a push to get started.
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Appendix L: Goal Orientation Measure

Indicate your level of agreement with the extent to which the following statements
describe your own behavior on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree).
1.

I prefer challenging and difficult classes so that I’ll learn a great deal.

2.

I truly enjoy learning for the sake of learning.

3.

I like classes that really force me to think hard.

4.

I’m willing to enroll in a different course if I can learn a lot by taking it.

5.

It’s important that others know that I am a good student.

6.
are.

I think that it’s important to get good grades to show how intelligent you

7.

It’s important for me to prove that I am better than others in the class.

8.

To be honest, I really like to prove my ability to others.

9.

I would rather drop a difficult class than earn a low grade.

10.
I would rather write a report on a familiar topic so that I can avoid doing
poorly.
11.

I am more concerned about avoiding a low grade than I am about learning.

12.

I prefer to avoid situations in classes where I could risk performing poorly.

13.

I enroll in courses in which I feel that I will probably do well.
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Appendix M: Experience with Excel

1) How frequently do you use Microsoft Word?
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

Multiple times per day
A few times per week
Once per week
A few per month
Once per month
Never

2) How frequently do you use Microsoft PowerPoint?
a) Multiple times per day
b) A few times per week
c) Once per week
d) A few per month
e) Once per month
f) Never
3) How frequently do you use Microsoft Outlook?
a) Multiple times per day
b) A few times per week
c) Once per week
d) A few per month
e) Once per month
f) Never
4) How frequently do you use Microsoft Publisher?
a) Multiple times per day
b) A few times per week
c) Once per week
d) A few per month
e) Once per month
f) Never
5) How frequently do you use Microsoft OneNote?
a) Multiple times per day
b) A few times per week
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c)
d)
e)
f)

Once per week
A few per month
Once per month
Never

6) How frequently do you use Microsoft Excel?
a) Multiple times per day
b) A few times per week
c) Once per week
d) A few per month
e) Once per month
f) Never
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Appendix N: Screen-shot of Data Logged using ManicTime
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Appendix O: Experimental Protocol
Instructions for Experimenters
Please follow the following protocol exactly when running the experiment;
standardization ensures that sessions can be compared. Each participant should
receive the same instructions in the same order.
Time
Possible
(min Activity
Specific Instructions
Questions
)
and Answers
-20
Check for
Setup
Important:
availability:
Before you
- lab room
1. Log onto lab machine using your
let the
- copies of
CampusConnect username and
participants
questionnaire
password.
into the
s
2. Put the “Experiment in Progress”
room, make
-pens /pencils
sheet on the door.
sure you
3. Check the Participation List to see: have a
a. The Experiment ID of new properly
participants you are waiting named Excel
for
file for them
b. The cue conditions
to work on.
randomly assigned to them:
i. 1 = Task Cue
Training
ii. 2 = Goal Cue
video has
iii. 3 = Both Task and
been opened
Goal Cues
in FULL
iv. 4 = No Cues
SCREEN
4. Check the volume of the computer MODE.
and increase if too low.
5. Open the link for the cognitive
ability test; minimize window.
6. Open the link for the working
memory test; minimize window.
7. Open the ManicTime program and
ensure this is running in the
background.
8. Open Qualtrics link for survey
(task self efficacy and post-task
survey); minimise window.
9. Create a new copy of the Excel
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data sheet, and paste it to the top
right corner of the Desktop. Once a
copy is on the desktop, rename it.
All Excel sheets should be named
with the participant number.
10. Go to your Research folder and
open the training video. Press
STOP to make sure the video
starts from the beginning.
11. Check your participant folder to
ensure it includes the appropriate
paperwork for each participant, in
the following order.
 1. Consent form
 2. General Instructions
 3. Task Instructions
 4. Post-experiment Survey
 You can start now!
0

Participant
arrives at
Byrne Hall.

Participant arrives at specific lab room. If
you are not ready, ask them to wait in
hallway.
When participant comes in, they should
put their RESEARCH SYSTEM ID on the
Experiment Session sheet. This is not their
Student ID.

0

Informed
consent

“This is our standard informed consent
form including some general
information on the experiment. Take

Q: What if
the
participant
does now
know his/her
research
system ID?
A: If they do
not know
their ID
number, ask
them to list
their first
and last
names so we
can look up
their ID
later.
Q: Why do I
have to sign
this form?
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Close door
and put do
not disturb
sign outside

your time to read the document and feel
free to ask me any questions.”
“I will be asking you some questions to
make sure you understand the consent
form.”
After participants have read: Ask these
questions for understanding: “What is the
purpose of this study? What are the
benefits? What are the risks?”

5

Working
memory test

Maximize the window for the working
memory task and insert the participant ID.
Inform the participant that he/she has 15
minutes to complete the test and remind
him/her to pay close attention to the
instructions for the test.

20

Cognitive
Ability Test

Maximize the window for the cognitive
ability and insert the participant ID.
Inform the participant that he/she has 12
minutes to complete the test and remind
him/her to pay close attention to the
instructions for the test.

32

Task
Instructions

35

Excel
Training

Remove the instructions for the task and
hand this to participant.
“These are the instructions for the task;
you have 3 minutes to review the
instructions. Please let me know if you
have any questions.”
1. Tell the participant to open the
Windows Media Player window
file to file screen, put their

162
A: This form
confirms that
everybody
has
participated
voluntarily
in this study.
You may
provide a
blank copy
of consent if
they wish to
keep it.
Note: Be
sure to start
your timer as
soon as the
participant
begins the
test.

Note: Be
sure to start
your timer as
soon as the
participant
begins the
test.
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2.

3.

55

Excel Task

1.

2.

3.
4.
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headphones on, and to press the
Blue Circle button at the bottom of
the screen.
When the video is over, tell
participants to press the Esc key on
the keyboard, and to then close the
Windows Media Player window.
Next, have the participants
complete the recall test. Inform the
participant that he/she has 10
minutes to complete this test.
Have the participant complete the
task-specific self efficacy measure
using the link provided.
Have participant open the Task
excel sheet (which you prepared,
renamed, and placed in the top
right corner of the Desktop earlier),
and give the participant the Task
questions from the folder. Tell the
participant that s/he has 15 minutes
to work on the task. Even if they
can’t finish everything, you should
take the task sheet back at the end
of 15 minutes duration.
Remind the participant to save all
work on the desktop.
Once the participant has completed
the task, instruct the participant to
complete the post-task survey.

Important!!
Please
check to
make sure
that the
participant
is not using
the split
screen
option to
work on
tasks.
Be sure to
monitor the
participant’
s
engagement
as he/she
works on
the task.
Make a note
in the lab
log if the
participant
appear
disengaged
(i.e., The
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Wrap-up

1. Thank the participant; remind not to
discuss the details of the study with
others who have not completed the
study.
2. Open the ManicTime software and
record the participant’s time spent
working on the Excel sheet and on
e-mail in seconds.
3. Staple all materials and place them
in the folder labeled “Study Data”.
4. We also have to keep record of the
Excel sheets they worked on. Save
the Excel file (used by participants)
to our “Data” folder in the Dropbox
folder labeled “Resource Allocation
Data”.
5. Log off.
6. Remove ‘do not disturb’ sign from
the door.
7. Be sure to lock the lab door and
scramble the code.
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person
appeared
off-task 1:
Never, 2:
For less
than 2
minutes, 3:
For less
than 5
minutes, 4:
For more
than 5
minutes).
Important:
When
recording
second from
the
ManicTime
software,
you will
need to
scroll down
and add all
times
recorded for
each as the
software will
show
multiple
entries for
each
program or
document
not a single
total).
WRITE
NOTES ON
LAB LOG
about how
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the session
went and
about the
participant’s
engagement
(be sure to
complete the
1-5 ratings
provided on
the log sheet
about the
participant’s
level of
engagement)
.

Other reminders: Be friendly and welcoming. Know that participants might be
out in the hallway waiting and may not knock on door. If there are any
computer issues – but sometimes just rebooting will clear things up. If there are
any major issues, please contact me at 618-560-3719.

